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Abstract 
 
Following the Second World War, Germany underwent a process designed to remove 
elements of Nazism from its population called denazification, and this process was the 
most far reaching in the United States’ Zone. As Germany lay in ruins, the Church 
experienced a surge in popularity, and the Protestant church in particular began to explore 
issues of guilt and judgment. In this dissertation, I aim to explore the relationship 
between the US Military Government, led by General Lucius Clay, and the Evangelical 
Church of Germany (EKD), led by Bishop Theophil Wurm, Martin Niemöller and others, 
on this issue of denazification. The first phase of denazification, which lasted from May 
1945 – March 1946 was administered by the United States. This was the harshest phase 
of the process, where everyone in the US Zone had to defend their time during the war 
years, and many were arrested without trial simply for having an affiliation with Nazism. 
Due to the size of the task and the return home of many American troops, however, 
denazification was transferred over to German administration in 1946, and generally 
made more lenient thereafter. Although the council of the EKD accepted their own guilt 
at Stuttgart, they believed that denazification could not morally rehabilitate the Germans 
into society. They fought against denazification in letters, statements, sermons, 
testimony, and numerous other ways that I will explain in my work. I aim to complete a 
picture started by other historians and explain the relationship between US Military 
Government and the EKD drawing heavily on German, British and American sources 
found in archives, memoirs, memorandums, laws, newspapers, and secondary historical 
works. The aim is to give equal focus to both the German Protestant church’s moves 
against denazification and the US Military Government’s response. 
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Introduction 
 
“Almost the entire world indicts Germany and the Germans. Our guilt is discussed in 
terms of outrage, horror, hatred, and scorn. Punishment and retribution are desired, 
not by the victors alone but also by some of the German émigrés and even by citizens 
of neutral countries. In Germany there are some who admit guilt, including their own, 
and many who hold themselves guiltless but pronounce others guilty. The temptation 
to evade this question is obvious…”1 
     - Karl Jaspers, The Question of German Guilt 
 
“World history is the world’s court of justice.”2 
      -Friedrich Schiller, Resignation 
 
 
In 1945, shortly after the fall of the Third Reich, the philosopher, psychiatrist, and 
theologian Karl Jaspers began a series of public lectures that asked the question that 
would define the occupation years: “Are the German people guilty?”3 In these lectures, 
Jaspers’ main argument was that “[t]he guilt question is more than a question put to us by 
others, it is one we put to ourselves. The way we answer it will be decisive for our 
present approach to the world and ourselves.”4 Jaspers was a committed anti-Nazi who 
had lost his teaching position in 1937 for writings that criticised racism and nationalism, 
and for having a Jewish wife.5 From his perspective there were varying degrees and types 
of guilt, and these differences were the basis for his lectures. His ideas were condensed in 
1947 in his short book Die Schuldfrage, or The Question of [German] Guilt, which stood 
not as an “evasive apology nor a thorough condemnation” but rather an examination of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  Karl Jaspers, The Question of German Guilt, trans. E. B. Ashton (Fordham University 
Press: New York, 2000), 21. 
 
2  “Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht”. 
 
3  Jaspers, The Question of German Guilt, vii-viii. 
 
4  Ibid, 22. 
 
5  Ibid, xvi. 
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degrees and types of guilt to explain how Germans might carry criminal, political, moral, 
and metaphysical guilt.6 Of these, he found metaphysical guilt the most interesting; his 
definition for it was that “[t]here exists a solidarity among men as human beings that 
makes each co-responsible for every wrong and every injustice in the world, especially 
for crimes committed in his presence or with his knowledge. If I fail to do whatever I can 
to prevent them, I too am guilty.”7 His conclusion was that the only way to create a new 
Germany was to confess German guilt to the world, and restructure society with God at 
the centre. 
Then, what was the process known as denazification? Was it anything more than a 
foreign attempt to force individual Germans to reflect and be punished for their own roles 
within the Third Reich? Or more pragmatically, was it simply an effort to ensure that 
people with Nazi sympathies were removed from positions of influence? Jaspers said that 
if one had adapted himself or herself to the party and enjoyed those benefits, they should 
not complain when they were later disadvantaged.8 However, denazification was not a 
process which dealt with a few individuals, but rather with millions; he acknowledged 
that “[d]enazification throws countless numbers out of their past course.”9 Jaspers argued 
against the policy by saying that it did not make sense to charge an entire people with 
these crimes, rather, “[t]he criminal is always only an individual” because “there is no 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6  Ibid, 25-26. 
 
7  Ibid, 26. 
 
8  Ibid, 97. 
 
9  Ibid, 15. 
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such thing as a people as a whole.”10 He broke this down further by positing, “[a] people 
cannot perish heroically, cannot be a criminal, cannot act morally or immorally; only its 
individuals can do so. A people as a whole can be neither guilty nor innocent, neither in 
the criminal nor in the political (in which only the citizenry of the state is liable) nor in 
the moral sense.”11 However, with denazification the Allies were seen to be casting 
verdicts, and only one group was left in Germany to raise any sort of protest.  
After a generation that experienced the upheavals of the First World War, the 
failed Weimar Republic, National Socialism, and World War II, German society was in 
total disrepair. The Government, the education system, the military, almost everything 
had been destroyed. Allied bombing and eastern expulsion had caused around twenty-six 
million Germans to become homeless.12 To the Germans in 1945, the churches were the 
“only major institutions that had largely maintained their institutional identities and 
structures from before the Nazi period.”13 They had been, like everything else, divided 
and co-opted by the Nazis, but following the destruction of Germany through the Second 
World War “[u]ntil a German government was reestablished in 1949, the churches 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10  In the late sixties, the historian Constantine FitzGibbon echoed this sentiment when he 
wrote that “[t[heologically ‘collective guilt’ must be a meaningless term, since there is no 
such thing as a ‘collective soul’”, and that the concept “Legal Collective Guilt” makes 
more sense, as accomplices are tried in a court of law, and almost all Germans were 
either active or passive accomplices. Constantine FitzGibbon, Denazification (Michael 
Joseph: London, 1969) 97. 
 
11  Jaspers, 34, 35. 
 
12  Richard Bessel, Germany 1945: From War to Peace (Pocket Books: London, 2010) 6. 
 
13  Jeffrey J. Olick, In the House of the Hangman: The Agonies of German Defeat, 1943 – 
1949 (The University of Chicago Press, 2005), 203. 
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constituted the most powerful and articulate voice of the German people.”14 In the 
American Zone particularly, the churches were the only organisation that could represent 
a leaderless population to the United States Military Government (from here onwards 
Military Government), and the fact that the rest of Europe contained their own 
denominations of churches also made the Church the only institution in Germany that 
could build international relationships. 
As a Hague report written in 1947 stated, “[d]espite the warfare waged against 
organised religion by the Nazis, the churches survived the Nazi defeat and, for a brief 
period, constituted the only organs of social continuity in an otherwise atomised 
society.”15 The churches, as the only possible leaders in a defeated Germany, had a 
difficult set of tasks. Many cities had been burnt to the ground, and in the aftermath of the 
fall of the totalitarian system, resuming daily life became a challenge for most. The 
country was in a state of uncertainty as to what the plans of the occupiers were and 
whether people would be able to stay warm or find food. Many Germans saw the Church 
as the only place they could turn to for help, rather than the American Military 
Government, which was an agent of a government that had so recently bombed their 
houses, killed their soldiers, and raped their women.16 What I want to focus on, however, 
is how the Protestant Church responded to Military Government regarding denazification, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14  Frederic Spotts, The Churches and Politics in Germany (Wesleyan University Press:  
Middletown, 1973) 51. 
 
15  Hoyt Price; Carl E. Schorske; The Problem of Germany: Two Reports for 
Consideration by a Preliminary Conference on The German Problem, The Hague 
October 7-10, 1947 (Council on Foreign Relations: New York, 1947). 
 
16  Matthew D. Hockenos, A Church Divided: German Protestants Confront the Nazi 
Past (Indian University Press: Bloomington, 2004) 53. 
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the demoralising and indiscriminate policy that was synonymous to many with “re-
education” and “was popularly equated with the Gestapo.”17  
In 1945, the Allies in the conquered state of Germany were in a unique position. 
They had gone to war not just to defeat Germany, but also Nazi ideology, and their 
witness to concentration and extermination camps made them believe that a new sort of 
mechanism was needed to cleanse Germany of Nazism and rebuild on a moral 
foundation.18 As occupiers they were now in a position where they had to eradicate all the 
Nazi laws, officials, and organisations.19 The mechanism chosen for the removal of Nazi 
influence from public life was denazification. The main guidelines were set by the victors 
during the Potsdam Conference in the summer of 1945, and detailed further by the Allied 
Control Council in Berlin, but for the most part the authorities of each zone could decide 
how they would enforce it.20 In contrast with denazification, which was aimed at the civil 
servants and private workers who worked for or profited from the Third Reich, war 
criminals were judged in Nuremberg up until 1949 in a separate tribunal system, which I 
will detail briefly in the epilogue.  
There was a disagreement among the zones on how denazification should be 
administered, and the American Zone alone made denazification the paramount goal of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17  Stewart Herman, The Rebirth of the German Church (London: S.C.M Press, 1946) 98. 
Olick, In the House of the Hangman, 130. 
 
18  Here I mean the Western Allies – the Soviets had their own work camps back home, 
and had different aims for denazification, which I will explore later on. 
 
19  John H. Herz, “The Fiasco of Denazification in Germany” Political Science Quarterly, 
Vol: 63, Issue: 4, December 1948, 570. 
 
20 Giles MacDonogh, After the Reich: The Brutal History of the Allied Occupation (Basic 
Books: New York, 2009) 11. 
	   11	  
its military government, with an aim of discovering the background of every German in 
that zone.21 It is this zone that I shall be focusing on. The moral failures of Nazism had 
made a process like denazification necessary for the creation of a new German state, one 
where former Nazis would not play a role. Today, there is little argument that this sort of 
process was needed, as many ordinary Germans were complicit in the crimes of the Third 
Reich, but there has been a consensus among German, British, and American historians, 
political scientists, and theologians that in practice denazification was a failed policy.22 
To understand failure early on, it is worth quoting the political scientist John Herz’s 1948 
critique of the denazification “fiasco”. He wrote: 
 
the standards were over – mechanical. Persons who had played an important role 
under the Nazis could escape the purges because, for one reason or another, they did 
not fall in one of the categories. On the other hand, there were large numbers of 
minor or merely nominal Nazis who, because they happened to have occupied 
certain rank or position, would be deprived of job and livelihood.23 
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21  Victoria Barnett, For the Soul of the People: Protestant Protest Against Hitler (Oxford 
University Press: New York, 2002) 218. 
 
22  Barnett, For the Soul of the People, 219; Perry Biddiscombe, The Denazification of 
Germany: A History 1945-1950 (Tempus: Chalford, 2007) 217; Walter Dorn, The 
Unfinished Purge. Manuscript detailing the history of denazification that was unfinished 
at the time of Dorn’s death. Found in Columbia University’s Rare Book and Manuscript 
Library, 18. Robert P. Ericksen, Complicity in the Holocaust: Churches and Universities 
in Nazi Germany, (Cambridge: 2012) 168; Herz, “The Fiasco of Denazification in 
Germany”, 569; William E. Griffith, “Denazification in the United States Zone of 
Germany” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 267, 
Military Government (January 1950) 74; John G. Kormann, US Denazification Policy in 
Germany 1944-50 (Historical Division: Office of the Executive Secretary: Office of the 
US High Commissioner for Germany: 1952) 140; MacDonogh, After the Reich, 357; 
Olick, In the House of the Hangman, 134; Helmut Thielicke, Notes from a Wayfarer: The 
Autobiography of Helmut Thielicke, trans. David R. Law (James Clark & Co: Cambridge, 
1995) 231; Harold Zink, The United States in Germany 1944-1955 (Greenwood Press 
Publishers: Westport, CT 1957) 164. 
 
23  Herz, “The Fiasco of Denazification in Germany”, 571. 
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Germany has had a long and unique history with Christianity. In 1933, the year 
that Adolf Hitler became Chancellor and the Nazi Party took power, about forty-one 
million of Germany’s sixty-five million people were classified as Protestant, and a further 
twenty-one million were classified as Roman Catholic.24 This unique divide in European 
history stems from the work of Martin Luther and the Treaty of Augsburg in 1555, 
“which gave each imperial prince the right to choose whether he and his subjects would 
therefore be Lutheran or Catholic.”25 Following the Thirty Years War with the Treaty of 
Westphalia in 1648, those regional ecclesiastical divisions were firmly rooted in 
Germany until the Second World War.26 The church, Protestant or Catholic, had a long 
tradition in Germany of working in alliance with German states.27 Throughout all of 
German history, there has been a lack of formal separation between Church and state. In 
1933 the churches, with very few exceptions, had “celebrated the rise of Hitler and the 
National Socialists.”28 They had despised the Weimar Republic and were hoping the Nazi 
accession to power signalled a German renewal. Many Christians in Germany were 
nationalists by nature, as they equated “being a good Christian with being a good 
German.”29 This soon changed as the nature of Nazism became apparent, and there was a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24  Hockenos, A Church Divided, 4. Less than one per cent were Jewish. 
 
25  Spotts, The Churches and Politics in Germany, 4. 
 
26  Ibid, 22. 
 
27  Benjamin Carl Pearson, (2006). Faith and Democracy: Political Transformations at 
the German Protestant Kirchentag. (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from ProQuest  
Dissertations and Theses. (Accession Order No. 3289016) 13. 
 
28  Ibid, 22. 
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split in the dominant Lutheran Church between the Confessing Church, which defined 
itself as independent from the Nazi state, and German Christians, who worked with the 
Third Reich. So after the war the Confessing Church, in its capacity as one of the only 
institutions that was able to represent the German people, was depended on by the Allies 
to take a commanding role in executing denazification.30 
The debate around denazification has been centred on Schuldfrage, war guilt, and 
the questions of guilt caused a divide between leaders in the post-war Church. Some of 
the nuances of the guilt have been demonstrated by Karl Jaspers, and the question of guilt 
will continue to be a recurring theme throughout this dissertation. Guilt has a long 
tradition in history – it was used by the Romans against the Carthaginians, Napoleon 
against Russia, and against the Germans at Versailles. In post-war Germany the term 
quickly became a political one, ensuring that guilt would be linked to other themes, and 
therefore rarely properly considered by ordinary Germans. 
Hans Habe, an Austrian born writer who had been expelled from the Reich and 
had moved to the United States, wrote in 1953, that according  
 
to American and English standards, [the Germans] were [collectively guilty]. They 
had voted a raving maniac into power. He might have falsified a majority into 
unanimity, the majority still existed. They had allowed him to abuse the institutions 
of democracy in order to finally destroy them. He met no resistance in his days of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29  Hockenos, A Church Divided, 87. 
 
30  Barnett, For the Soul of the People, 217. 
It should be kept in mind that the religious map of Germany looked radically different in 
1939 than it did in 1945. There was a massive migration of Germans, both Catholic and 
Protestant in 1945, and whereas before the war most regions of Germans were 
homogenously either Catholic or Protestant, after the war this framework was destroyed 
as eastern migrants and refugees began to settle in places not based on their religion. This 
flux would continue over the next few years. Spotts, The Churches and Politics in 
Germany, 50. 
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glory and very little in his days of doom. They actively sustained, silently tolerated, 
or irresponsibly overlooked the most abominable crimes ever committed in the 
history of mankind. They openly prepared and happily pursued a war, and only 
objected to it when it was lost.31 
 
 
Habe had been against the policy of denazification as it was practiced, arguing that it 
would not lead Germans to self-reflection or increase their readiness for re-education.32 
He argued later that “[i]f the Germans were collectively guilty, we should have concealed 
it from them.”33  
This was a view not widely shared inside Germany. According to the American 
zone’s Military Government’s public opinion polls about seventy per cent of those asked 
“rejected the notion that Germans bore total responsibility [Gesamtverantwortung] for the 
war” in the early post-war years.34 Theodor Heuss, the first president of West Germany, 
argued that seeing every German as guilty was similar to the Third Reich seeing every 
Jew as guilty, and instead argued that Germans should feel collective shame.35 Others 
have argued that instead of thinking of guilt, perhaps the better term would be debt, as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31  Hans Habe, Our Love Affair with Germany, 2-3; cited in Olick, In the House of the 
Hangman, 182-183. 
 
32  Frederick Taylor, Exorcising Hitler: The Occupation and Denazification of Germany  
(Bloomsbury: London, 2011) 286. 
 
33  Olick, In the House of the Hangman, 182-183.  
 
34  Robert G. Moeller, West Germany under Construction: Politics, Society, and Culture 
in the Adenauer Era (The University of Michigan Press, 1997) 77.  
 
35  “‘One has spoken of a collective guilt [Kollektivschuld] of the German people. The 
word collective guilt and what stands behind it is a crude simplification [simple 
Vereinfachung], it is a reversal namely of the same way the Nazis saw the Jews: that the 
fact of being a Jew already contained within it the phenomenon of guilt.’ In contrast, 
Heuss offered collective shame: ‘Something like a collective shame [Kollektivscham] has 
grown and remained from this time.’” Olick, In the House of the Hangman, 268. 
	   15	  
guilt lasts forever, but a debt can be repaid. In the Bible, the Old Testament refers to the 
guilt of nations, while the New Testament has guilt more focused on the individuals. 
With this understanding, the Catholic Church argued that all guilt was individual, and 
therefore the church institutions had done nothing wrong.36  
 The Protestant Church, however, did publicly acknowledge its guilt as early as 
October 1945. I will explain the importance of the Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt in the 
second chapter, but it is important to note that, in its role as the leaders of a leaderless 
population, the Protestant Church did accept its own guilt for the crimes of National 
Socialism. 
Ultimately, collective guilt was not useful in rebuilding Germany and making it 
an ally in the Cold War, so the United States informally let go of the idea, and formally 
ended its involvement in denazification, in 1948. Germans began to make distinctions 
between “the regime” and “the Volk”, placing the guilt on the former. The Church was 
still busy working to address unemployment, lack of coal and food, travel, what was 
happening in the Soviet Zone, amongst a myriad of other pressing concerns. These issues 
kept the Church busy for years - denazification was important, but it was hardly the 
Church’s only concern.37 
The document that brought the war in Europe to an end was signed on 8 May 
1945, a date that some call the Stunde Null, or zero hour, for the German people, at least 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36  Ibid, 229. 
 
37  “Report of the [British] Council’s [of Churches] Delegates to the German Church” 
[28. November – 13. Dezember 1945] in Clemens Vollnhals, Die evangelische Kirche 
nach dem Zusammenbruch: Berichte ausländischer Beobachter aus dem Jahre 1945 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988) 293. 
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in the short term.38 After the chaotic final four months of the war, “Nazism was no longer 
identified with economic recovery, order, conquest and strength, but rather with fear and 
wanton murder.”39 The term “zero hour” is a controversial one amongst historians, 
because continuities existed in Germany beyond 8 May 1945; however, to the Germans 
in the post-war era, “[w]hen it was all over, the overwhelming feeling was at once of 
exhaustion and relief; Germans reacted almost as though Hitler and the Third Reich 
belonged to a distant past.”40 Depending on how one looks at it, Germany was either 
defeated this day or liberated from the evils of National Socialism. Few in Germany 
thought of themselves as liberated, rather they used the term Zussamenbruch, meaning 
disastrous collapse, to define the current state of Germany.41 Either way, a unified 
German state ceased to exist on this day, and was soon replaced by four economically 
and politically independent occupied zones. The American Zone, which will be the focus 
of my research, consisted of what was roughly the southeast quadrant of Germany, and 
included Bavaria, Hesse, and Baden-Württemberg. The United States Military 
Government was headquartered in Frankfurt am Main, although this was not set up as the 
capital because, as the Military Governor Lucius Clay put it, creating a capital “might 
lead to charges that we were setting up a separate government.” Other cities within the 
zone included Stuttgart, where a permanent secretariat was installed, Bremen, which was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38  Or rather, due to a late start the treaty was signed just after midnight on 9 May, with 8 
May written on the document and thus used as the traditional dating. Bessel, Germany 
1945, 131.  
 
39  Ibid, 66; 336. 
 
40  Ibid, 147. 
 
41  John S. Conway, “How Shall the Nations Repent? The Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt,  
October 1945” Journal of Ecclesiastical History Vol. 38, No. 4, October 1987, 603. 
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carved out of the British zone to give the United States a port, Munich, Heidelberg, 
Nuremberg, Karlsruhe, and the American section of Berlin.42 Harry Truman, the new 
United States President, had not been left with a clear policy fashioned by Franklin 
Roosevelt’s administration when he had assumed the presidency upon Roosevelt’s death 
in April of 1945, so as President he was responsible for the fashioning of the United 
States occupation policy.43  
Before I discuss denazification, however, a bit more ink should be used to discuss 
the harsher alternative that Germans feared: the Morgenthau Plan. Although it was never 
put into action, it caused many Germans to look upon their occupiers with fear and 
suspicion. Henry Morgenthau Jr., the United States Secretary of the Treasury, initially 
presented the plan at the Quebec conference of September 1944. In its essence, the plan 
called for Germany to be transformed from an industrial to an agricultural state that could 
not have the means to wage war. Morgenthau was from a prominent American Jewish 
family; his father had been the ambassador to the Ottoman Empire under President 
Woodrow Wilson, and he had served with Roosevelt for all four of his terms in office. 
Contemporaries were able to discredit (and historians have since explained) 
Morgenthau’s proposals by stressing his Jewish heritage, but this does not completely 
explain his position. As a young man in Turkey, Morgenthau had been in close proximity 
to Armenia during that genocide, and had deeper, more pragmatic reasons to oppose what 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42  Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 
1950), 86. 
 
43  Griffith, “Denazification in the United States Zone of Germany”, 68. 
Of course, even if there had been a clear policy, the decisions were now Truman’s, and 
he could choose to ignore Roosevelt’s plans. 
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had happened in Germany.44 Still, many people only saw Morgenthau as reacting to the 
Third Reich’s anti-Semitic policies; in this respect, he proved more useful for Nazi 
propaganda than for US policy - for example, Joseph Goebbels’s term for Morgenthau 
was jüdische Racheengel or the “Jewish Angel of Revenge.”45  
Although Morgenthau had initially received the support of Roosevelt, Joseph 
Stalin, and a reluctant Winston Churchill, at the end of the war President Harry Truman 
rejected the plan, going so far as to call it “crazy.”46 Morgenthau was not the only man in 
high office to take such a hard line towards post-war Germany; he enjoyed the company 
of the English diplomat Robert Vansittart.47 The United States post-war policy debate, 
however, was between Henry Morgenthau’s plan for deindustrialisation and neutering 
Germany and the desire to turn Germany into a partner in democracy, as expressed by the 
War Department, led by Henry L. Stimson.48 This debate fit in with a larger narrative of 
two Germanys, one that was militant and from which National Socialism was a natural 
outgrowth, and the other a land of culture that was ruled by an unrepresentative segment 
of the population.49 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44  Olick, In the House of the Hangman, 76. 
 
45  Ibid, 29. 
 
46  Ibid, 92; MacDonogh, After the Reich, 8. 
 
47  MacDonogh, After the Reich, 5 
 
48  Olick, In the House of the Hangman, 17. 
 
49  Ibid, 153. 
Ein Volk von Dichtern und Denkern / Ein Volk von Richtern und Henkern (A people of 
poets and thinkers / a people of judges and executioners). 
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In the end the War Department’s plan, authored by Stimson and Assistant 
Secretary of War John J. McCloy, was more influential in crafting the occupation policy. 
Only traces of Morgenthau’s plan, in a watered down state, were included in Joint Chiefs 
of Staff (JCS) directive 1067. Although Morgenthau had been denied, the United States 
did not take a lenient attitude towards the Germans – rather, JCS 1067 stated “Germany 
will not be occupied for the purpose of liberation but as a defeated enemy nation. Your 
aim is not oppression but to occupy Germany for the purpose of realising certain 
important Allied objectives.”50 Unlike the Morgenthau Plan, JCS 1067 was a short-term 
directive, and represented the policy of the American Zone for the “initial post-defeat 
period,” 1945-1947, and was “not intended to be an ultimate statement of the policies of 
this [i.e. the US] Government concerning the treatment of Germany in the post-war 
world.”51  The policy provided, amongst other provisions, prohibition of payment of “all 
military pensions, or other emoluments or benefits, except compensation for physical 
disability limiting the recipient’s ability to work, at rates which are no higher than the 
lowest of those for comparable physical disability arising from non-military causes.”52 
Although Morgenthau’s plan (as originally conceived) was never realised, it continued to 
be part of the German narrative of victimisation at the hands of the Allies, a narrative 
Germans conflated with denazification.  
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Despite the fact that the Morgenthau plan was never implemented, the first few years 
of occupation were very harsh on most Germans. Those in the American Zone arguably 
had it best, because it was the only zone in which the occupiers did not face food 
shortages at home; but this early stage was full of migration from the east, hunger, cold, 
automatic arrest, and mass denazification. What I have to say about denazification cannot 
be summed up here – indeed, most of the dissertation will be devoted to it. Denazification 
was the process of removing Nazis from public life outlined in JCS 1067, and later 
Military Law No. 8.53 At first a special branch of Military Government’s Public Safety 
Branch (called “Special Branch”) administered the denazification Spruchkammer, the 
term for the tribunals, but in March of 1946 Military Government passed the Law for 
Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism and German tribunals from then on 
administered denazification proceedings.  
After three years, the United States Congress decided that Military Government had 
had enough time and resources to remove Nazi influence from Germany, and cut off 
funding for denazification in 1948. The focus was at this point shifted onto rebuilding the 
nation under the Marshall Plan.54 In June of that year, using currency reform as a pretext, 
the Soviet Union closed off the western occupied parts of Berlin, denying access to 
outside food supplies. This was an attempt to take control of the city, and the United 
States responded by airlifting food, medicine, fuel, and other types of aid to their former 	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enemies. It was now apparent that Germany was no longer to be treated as a defeated 
nation, but rather a potential ally in the rising Cold War. Within one year of the Berlin 
Blockade the Western Zones of Germany, now the Federal Republic of Germany, would 
hold free and fair elections, electing Konrad Adenauer, leading a party based on Christian 
values called the Christian Democratic Union, as Chancellor. 
I have considered closely the theology of the key Protestant figures, because some of 
the writers of the secondary history have not appeared interested. I think this lack of 
interest has prevented them from having a full understanding. However, my main focus is 
in looking at the Protestant Church as a social institution with the ability to define guilt 
and influence the politics surrounding denazification. I have chosen to study the 
Protestant Church and not the Catholic Church because as I read through my source 
material, I began to feel that only the surface had been scratched on this subject, and that 
I could make a real contribution to what had already been researched and written. This 
study is limited from 1945 to 1948, and furthermore only to areas of denazification in 
which the Protestant Church was involved. 
After this introduction, I have three chapters and an epilogue in which to explore 
these issues. In the first chapter, I aim to explore the Church structure from the Third 
Reich to the end of denazification. This means looking at the Confessing Church at the 
end of the war, in particular its leadership, men such as Karl Barth, Theophil Wurm, 
Martin Niemöller, Hans Asmussen, and F. K. Otto Dibelius. I will explore their 
commitments to anti-Nazism, their relationship with Military Government, as well as 
their stances on guilt. I will also give some background into the development of 
denazification, and how each zone implemented it.  
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The next two chapters will be more chronological than thematic, and will tackle how 
these churchmen tackled denazification. Chapter two will trace the phase of 
denazification, under the control of Military Government, and the organisation of church 
leadership in the Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland (the Evangelical Church of 
Germany, from now on to be referred to as the EKD) as well as the Stuttgart Declaration 
of Guilt. In the final chapter, I will detail denazification following the Law for Liberation, 
which placed the process under German administration. I will also explore the 
amendments of October 1947 and March 1948, which helped to bring denazification to 
an end. After that I will examine the Darmstadt Declaration, a Protestant statement that 
attempted to place the Third Reich into a theological framework, giving Christians the 
ability to reflect upon their sins and move forward in harmony with God’s plan. The 
chapter will conclude when the process was put to an end in May of 1948. In the epilogue 
I will explore what happened with denazification and the EKD from 1948-1950, the 
further political endeavours of Protestant church leaders, and the legacy of denazification. 
Within this semi-chronological outline, a number of diverse sources will fill the 
narrative of the Church’s response to and interaction with Military Government. Because 
the early years of the EKD and the United States denazification policy are usually studied 
separately, there is a wide variety of secondary source literature. Every study of German 
churches in the early post-war years begins with Frederic Spotts’ 1973 book The 
Churches and Politics in Germany, which illustrates both Protestant and Catholic 
rebuilding in the post-war years, and devotes significant attention to denazification. 
Clemens Vollnhal’s 1989 work Evangelische Kirche und Entnazifizierung 1945-1949 
probably most resembles my research, but deals less with the American Military 
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Government perspective and more with the considerations of the Church. Vollnhal’s also 
published a collection of primary sources in 1988 titled Die evangelische Kirche nach 
dem Zusammenbruch, which included several interviews with and impressions of 
Confessing Church leaders in the post-war years. More recently, Robert P. Ericksen 
published a short essay titled “Hiding the Nazi Past: Denazification and Christian 
Postwar Reckoning in Germany”, which considers parts of my argument, although not to 
the same depth. Matthew Hockenos’ work A Church Divided has been another 
particularly important piece of secondary literature, as it explains the ecclesiastic debates 
that surround the statements of guilt made at Stuttgart and Darmstadt, although he does 
not explore denazification. The secondary sources written by Richard Bessel, John S. 
Conway, Jeffrey J. Olick, and Giles MacDonogh, were helpful because they describe, at 
length, Germany in 1945, church debates, guilt, and occupation policy, respectively. 
Sometimes primary sources, such as letters and statements, can be hard to track down, 
and the best I can find in some cases are descriptions from these sources.  
Stuart Herman, an American church representative who had preached at an American 
church in Germany until 7 December 1941, wrote a book titled The Rebirth of the 
German Church in 1946. He had toured Germany in an effort to understand German 
church concerns in the post-war years, attended the Treysa conference and met with men 
such as Theophil Wurm, Karl Barth and Martin Niemöller, and his book is invaluable for 
understanding their post-war milieu. In his work, he puts the definitive question of the 
post-war Church as:  
 
Can the Church and Military Government combine forces for the strenuous work of 
German rehabilitation in the society of nations, or will the Church eventually feel 
obliged to adopt Nehemiah’s plan for the reconstruction of Jerusalem’s devastated 
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walls to its own circumstances: work swiftly with the tools of spiritual revival, but 
stand ready to repel every new enemy with the weapons of religious resistance?55  
 
 
Many of the key figures that took part in denazification felt strongly enough about 
what had happened that they would later reflect upon the subject in memoirs and 
histories, such as Theophil Wurm, Helmut Thielicke, Hermann Diem, Otto Dibelius, 
Marshall Knappen, and Walter Dorn. Perhaps the figure that merits the first introduction 
and examination, however, is General Lucius Dubignon Clay. Clay’s memoir Decision in 
Germany, as well as the collected two volume The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay 
Germany 1945-1949 have been the most useful writings from a key figure because not 
only does Clay admit his overall admiration for the German commitment to Christianity, 
but also his frustration in dealing with Church leaders on denazification. General Clay 
was the deputy military governor of the United States Zone of Occupied Germany under 
General Eisenhower from 1945-1947, and military governor from 1947-1949. Clay is 
most famous for his role in orchestrating the Berlin airlift in 1948, but I am more 
interested in his role in denazification, which he reflects upon in depth in his memoirs. 
He details the origins of denazification, the introduction of the Law for Liberation, and 
his quixotic attempt to keep it alive after the United States Government had lost interest. 
He is at once compassionate “for the plight of the average German,” and pragmatic in his 
approach to creating a state that could function without American taxpayer aid.56 A man 
of fierce integrity, Clay offered his resignation eleven times during the course of his 
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governorship when given orders to do something he did not believe in. His resignation 
was refused every time, and he prevailed in the bureaucratic policy wars.57  
Lucius Clay was convinced that a political purge of Germany was a necessity. His 
zealous attitude towards denazification was not because he wanted to be brutal or punish 
the Germans, rather he believed in the policy.58 In some circumstances, Clay showed 
clemency, such as when he commuted the death sentences of Erwin Metz and Ludwig 
Merz, two convicted war criminals who had put over three hundred and fifty Americans 
into forced labour, seventy of whom died under their brutality. The commutation of their 
sentences inclined Germans to be more favourable towards the American occupiers.59 He 
also shortened the sentence of Ilse Koch, the “Bitch of Buchenwald”, who had 
“flaunt[ed] her sex, emphasized by tight sweaters and short skirts, before the long-
confined male prisoners.” Clay wrote that as he examined her record, he could not 
identify her as a participant to Buchenwald’s major crimes. For this he was accused of 
being soft on former Nazis, which he saw as an awkward accusation considering he had 
approved death sentences for more than two hundred German war criminals.60  
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Another important source that helps to explain Military Government’s perspective 
is John G. Kormann’s Columbia 1950 Ph.D. dissertation US Denazification Policy in 
Germany 1944-50. As a soldier during the war, Kormann had been a member of a team 
that specialised in capturing high-level Nazis. When the war ended, he was put in charge 
of a Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) office, where he helped to administer 
denazification. His dissertation “was later published by the Department of State, by [High 
Commissioner of Germany]’s Historical Division as a monograph in response to requests 
from Congress for information on denazification in Germany.”61 Kormann’s history was 
a great find for my work, as he was able to blend his own experiences and proper 
historical methodology to create a work that carefully articulates the history of America’s 
denazification policy. In his work, he also includes the March 1946 agreement as to how 
the churches would denazify their clergymen, which I have included as an appendix. 
I had the opportunity to visit the Zentralarchiv of the EKD in Berlin in late March 
and early April of 2014 and the National Archives in London in July, and looked over 
private correspondence, notes, and declarations from the EKD (usually to the United 
States Military Government) that are relevant to this work, and I will explain their 
purpose as they arise. Included in the Zentralarchiv was a collection of speeches, 
sermons, and memorandum by the EKD collected by Konrad Merzyn in 1993 entitled 
Kundgebungen. I have also been fortunate to have relevant sources sent to me from the 
Center for Barth Studies at Princeton, the Andover-Harvard Theological Library, and the 
Rare Book and Manuscript Library of Columbia University. Martin Niemöller, Karl 
Barth, Otto Dibelius, and Theophil Wurm all wrote extensively about guilt in documents 	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I have been able to find, but often said little about denazification in their published 
writings. One of the best example of this was a widely circulated short book I found in 
the University of Edinburgh special collections titled Die Schuld der Anderen (The Guilt 
of Others), which is a series of letters by two former Confessing Church preachers, 
Helmut Thielicke and Hermann Diem, debating the role of guilt.  
Because of its importance in understanding the EKD’s post-war attitude, the text 
of the Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt is in the appendix, and I have been able to find 
interviews with some of the signatories expressing their opinion on the statement. Other 
primary sources include newspaper and magazine articles that are about the key figures 
or help to explain the denazification process. 
Finally, I want to discuss one of my favourite sources for this research. On 23 
December 2013, I had the pleasure of interviewing Dr. George Wham, a man who almost 
seventy years ago served as Major George Wham US Army, an economics officer and 
sometimes as a denazification judge in Karlsruhe, Germany. Besides this interview, Dr. 
Wham allowed me to photocopy a report that he had written to the Military Government 
on 31 October 1945, detailing the economic situation in Karlsruhe that month, as well as 
giving an update on how denazification was being handled. Included in the report is the 
full text of Military Government law No. 8, the law that kept any former party member 
from achieving anything except the lowest level of employment. The text of the law was 
especially useful, and parts of his report are quoted throughout this dissertation.  
What I am seeking from all of these sources is an understanding of how the 
leaders of the Protestant Church interacted with Military Government during the process 
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of denazification.62 Although historians such as Lutz Niethammer, Perry Biddiscombe, 
Rebecca Boehling, James F. Tent, and Tom Bower have looked at this issue, it has only 
been part of the larger context of the denazification tribunals: by focusing in on the 
church leaders, I hope to explain the most articulate and pressing complaints about the 
process from within Germany. As for the German language, in the footnotes and 
bibliography I make note if what I have read was translated, otherwise I have provided 
the translations. Throughout my work I introduce phrases in German first, such as 
Spruchkammer, Schuldfrage, and Frageboge, and then give the definition, such as 
tribunal, question of war guilt, and denazification questionnaire.  
Despite the failures of denazification, I believe Germany has since made a serious 
effort to accept blame and move on. The war left Germany destroyed, occupied and 
divided between the victors. Following the war and the reconstruction of Europe under 
the Marshall Plan, West Germany experienced the Wirtschaftswunder, an economic 
miracle that provided them with a rapidly growing GDP and an unemployment rate that 
hovered around zero per cent. By the 1960s the West German economy was so strong 
that the West Germans alone could not sustain it, and guest workers from Italy and 
Turkey were brought in to work. Capitalism is of course a boom and bust cycle, but West 
and unified Germany’s busts have been short, and today Germany is an economic 
powerhouse, with the highest GDP in Europe, fourth highest in the world, and it 
continues to enjoy lower unemployment than its neighbours. In our postmodern time it is 
important to reflect on our biases and understand the purpose of our writing, so I want to 
make it clear that by focusing on guilt and denazification I do not mean in any way to say 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 With this representation, Protestant means the Lutheran, United, and Reform Churches, 
all of which had representation within the EKD. 
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that contemporary Germany is built by former Nazis who managed to avoid 
denazification. I instead want to illustrate how the Protestant Church took what it 
believed was a moral stance against denazification, because it believed that it was the 
church’s responsibility to rebuild Germany with a Christian foundation and because 
church leaders believed the process of denazification was failing Germany. To better 
understand the churches response to and interactions with denazification, it is now time to 
turn the page back to 1945, the end of the war in Germany. 
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Chapter 1  
The Confessing Church and Occupied State 
 
 
“The German Church must act as custodian of German National Policy so that the 
human rights of the population might be continually protected.”1 
   - Martin Niemöller, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 3 September 1945   
 
“For better of for worse, the German Church – like any other – is a piece of 
Christendom; what it did or did not do, what it is doing or is not doing, represents a 
subject of far-reaching importance to all Christians”2 
- Stuart Herman, 1946 
 
 
The Protestant Church had not been able to remain completely independent under 
the Third Reich, and there had been a divide between the Deutsche Christen, or German 
Christian Church, which had worked with the Nazi state to bring the churches in line with 
party policy, and the Bekennende Kirche, or Confessing Church, which resisted any state 
control of the church. When Adolf Hitler was appointed Chancellor, many Protestant 
leaders supported his general worldview, acknowledging the failures of the Weimar 
Republic. For the spiritual malaise of the 1920s, “Nazism had falsely presented itself as 
the cure.”3 National Socialism promised to return dignity to a defeated Germany, it 
promised the German people secure employment, “security for the individual and his 
family, a generous provision of good housing for families with many children, and 
equally generous pensions for old age.”4 When Hitler named Ludwig Müller as his 
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Reichsbischof in 1933, Protestant leaders were upset by his German Christian policies, 
but they largely blamed Müller, and did not find this indicative of Hitler.5 When Müller 
personally fired both the head of the Bavaria and Württemberg synods, Hans Meiser and 
Theophil Wurm, in 1934 for not falling in line with the German Christian movement, 
Hitler soon reinstated them in the wake of massive protests.6 It is from here that we have 
a split, and the beginnings of the Confessing Church.  
When the war ended, most of the German Christians resigned or were arrested; 
those who remained lacked tangible influence.7 This created a power vacuum in the 
church, which was to be filled by members of the Confessing Church. It was the pastors 
and theologians who had been in the Confessing Church that would be charged with 
restructuring post-war German Protestantism structurally, politically, and morally. The 
German Christians dealt with its role in the Third Reich through silence, denial, and 
rationalisation. Despite being arrested and tried, many of these German Christians would 
later be granted clemency and would return to church work.8 Most German Christians 
had never joined the Nazi party. Nazism was inherently opposed to religion, and German 
Christians had assumed the impossible task of marrying Christianity to the Third Reich. 
The origins of the Confessing Church can be traced back to Pastor Martin 
Niemöller, who formed the Pfarrernotbund, or Emergency Covenant of Pastors, in 1933. 	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His goal was to organise church leaders to defend the independence of their churches 
from the German Christians. It was set up after that group had introduced legislation to 
remove any Jewish influence from Christianity, such as the so-called “Aryan Paragraph”, 
which stated that nobody who worked for the Church could have Jewish ancestry, as well 
as a separate push to remove the Old Testament from German Bibles.9 Niemöller’s group 
of dissenting churches evolved into the Confessing Church, which reached its highest 
point in 1934 when leaders met in the city of Barmen and published the Barmen 
Declaration of Faith, which rejected the subjugation of the Church to the State. Working 
within the confines of the Nazi state, the church leaders at Barmen were careful not to 
criticise the Nazis, but rather focused on the German Christians.10 The Swiss Reformed 
theologian Karl Barth authored the declaration, and soon the unity that the document 
created was lost because Barth’s ideas began to cause a divide amongst Lutherans.11  
It should be noted that although the Barmen Declaration had been written in 
response to the “Aryan Paragraph”, the Confessing Church did not necessarily stand up 
for the Jews. Anti-Semitism was too institutionalised in the Church for there to be any 
sort of official statement condemning Nazi actions, and many church leaders remained 
silent on the issue during the war and until an official statement was made in 1950.12 
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Although he did not survive into the post-war period, one cannot discuss the 
Confessing Church or its legacy without discussing Dietrich Bonhoeffer, who was 
executed just a month before the war ended at the age of 39. Unlike Karl Barth, whose 
work is written for an intellectual theological audience, Bonhoeffer wrote with the 
intention of being read and understood by the average parishioner. Bonhoeffer believed 
that the Nazis were a society that had fallen away from Christ, and as early as 1931 he 
looked to a denazified Germany. He believed in collective guilt, and believed that 
Germany’s redemption could only be achieved through confession. He was the most 
radical member of the Confessing Church, and was executed by hanging at the 
Flossenbürg Concentration Camp for his connections to the 20 July 1944 plot to kill 
Hitler. His legacy is as a Christian Martyr, but not all church leaders saw him that way, 
since his example highlighted his isolation and made other church leaders look worse for 
having survived the Nazi years.13 
From 1935 onwards the Confessing Church lacked tangible unity and split into 
two weak and divergent communities, the conservative Barmensians and the reform 
minded Dahlemites.14 This split, and the fact that Barth returned to Switzerland in 1935 
and Martin Niemöller was imprisoned in 1937, led to the Confessing Church’s failure to 
have any successful influence against Nazism. In this Kirschenkampf (church struggle) 
between the German Christians and the two factions of the Confessing Church, many 
Christians in Germany decided not to support any group. There seem to be no reliable 
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statistics on how many people were part of each group, but as many as eighty per cent of 
Germans were in the neutral category, looking to either abstain from making any 
commitment or to find their own position between the two.15  
There was a widespread religious revival for both Catholics and Protestants in 
Germany when the war ended in 1945, occasionally referred to as “the hour of the 
church”.16 There have been various theories as to why the Church experienced post-war 
popularity  – perhaps it was a rejection of Nazism and return to a more traditional 
German culture, or it might have been a way to help cope with defeat and loss. 
Alternatively, Germans might have wanted a warm space in which to spend a few hours a 
week in and a community that might be able to help them find food or work.17 How 
authentic this religious revival was is also debatable – the historian Perry Biddiscombe 
notes that “[t]here was some debate among church-men… about whether their new 
popularity owed to a genuine religious awakening amongst their countrymen, or if 
masses of ex-Nazis and supporters of Hitler were simply trying to whitewash themselves 
by claiming a new spirituality.”18 The Confessing Church naturally became the face of 
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Protestant Christianity in Germany, but when the nation was defeated in May of 1945, 
little remained of the organisation. Dietrich Bonhoeffer had been executed only a month 
prior, and many other leaders had been killed, imprisoned, deported, removed from 
office, or otherwise compromised. Eager to get back to work, the remaining leaders of the 
Confessing Church soon met under Allied auspices in Treysa to begin work on healing 
the spiritual wounds of the country. Before I get to that meeting, however, it would be 
appropriate to give an introduction to some of the most important church leaders. 
Key Figures of the Confessing Church in 1945 
Bishop Theophil Wurm called the meeting at Treysa after convincing the Allies to 
allow him to tour the western zones in an effort to re-establish the Church.19 He has 
usually been given the credit for organising the Evangelical Church of Germany (EKD). 
Wurm was one of many church leaders who initially favoured the Nazis as an alternative 
to the Weimar republic, but he soon grew disenchanted over the Nazi’s religious policies. 
Unlike Barth and Niemöller, Wurm chose to avoid deportation or imprisonment and 
instead occasionally cooperated with the Nazis to secure his position in the Wurttemberg 
church hierarchy; nevertheless, he continued to condemn programmes he disagreed with, 
especially euthanasia. In 1941 he made the accusation that “Nazi leaders are waging war 
against Christianity,” but it appears that he openly criticised the Nazis and the Third 
Reich more often towards the end of the war (when it was too late to have much effect).20 
Despite his compromising, the German Christians removed his title of bishop twice 
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because of his support for the Barmen declaration, and it was only reinstated when Hitler 
pardoned him in the wake of protests from his parishioners. 
It is important to remember that Wurm was seventy-seven in 1945, a senior 
churchmen, which helped establish him as the de facto leader of the German Protestants 
before the Treysa meeting. Wurm was also the only church leader that both the opposing 
Dahlemite and Barmensian wings of the Confessing Church were enthusiastic about.21 
This made him the ideal person to organise the meetings to form the EKD. 
Wurm did not believe in stressing the collective guilt of all Germans. He believed 
that this concept was too much of a burden to put on the German people at this juncture, 
and that an admission of guilt would cause people to turn their backs on the Church.22 He 
instead cited Lutheran doctrine of separating the political and ecclesiastical spheres. 
Although few church leaders were favourable to the American Military Government, 
Wurm was perhaps the most vehemently distrustful, fearing it would use the church as a 
tool to further punish the defeated Germans. He saw denazification as a manifestation of 
this fear.  In a memorandum to Military Government on a conversation he had had with 
Wurm, the American diplomat Jacob D. Beam wrote that “[t]here is no doubt that Bishop 
Wurm is nationalist in his outlook and will try all along the line to get an amelioration of 
the restrictions and terms imposed upon his people. He regards himself as the 
unquestioned leader of the German Protestant Church and said his position as such was 
recognized…”23 
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Wurm, like many other Christian leaders, was against communism, and as he 
grew increasingly embittered with Military Government, he began to compare 
denazification to communism, telling the New York Times that “extreme left elements are 
using the denazification laws to destroy Germany’s leading classes of educated men… 
There is something Bolshevistic about it.”24 He was not the only one who held this belief, 
as the historian Frederic Spotts argued that the churches “realized that if denazification 
swept out everyone who was tainted virtually only Social Democrats and communists 
would remain eligible for positions in civil government, industry, and education,” a 
prospect which “fairly terrified” them.25 This was a common criticism of denazification, 
held by both the Protestant and Catholic churches.26   
Pastor Martin Niemöller was the theological leader who best represented 
Christian resistance to Nazism in the post-war era, and this made him instrumental in the 
formation of the EKD after the war. Niemöller had angrily told Hitler on 25 January 1934 
that the Church would not allow the Nazis to take control or exert influence over their 
congregations.27 He was later arrested for anti-Nazi rhetoric at the Dahlem Lutheran 
Church in Berlin and was imprisoned in Dachau and later Sachsenhausen concentration 
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camps from 1937 to 1945, mostly held in solitary confinement.28 Here he was Hitler’s 
personal prisoner, and as such could not be harmed by anyone without the Führer’s 
orders, could continue to collect a salary from the Dahlem church, and was allowed 
occasional visits with his wife, Else.29 When he was released in 1945, Niemöller decided 
not to return to his duties as pastor at Dahlem, rather he remained in Hesse working on 
foreign relations and was eventually elected president of the Nassau-Hesse synod.30 
Despite his anti-Nazi views, Niemöller had a reputation as a committed 
nationalist. During World War I, he served as a U-boat commander, and both he and his 
brother, Pastor Wilhelm Niemöller, had supported and voted for the Nazi party when they 
were still a fringe group in the nineteen twenties.31 When World War II broke out, he 
wrote a letter to Admiral Raeder, Commander in Chief of the Navy, from his prison cell 
asking if he could reenlist for submarine duty. He was denied, but when the war ended he 
did not hide this information, rather he acknowledged it and admitted he had felt a duty to 
Germany. This, of course, compromised his position in German society immediately after 
the war.32 Three of his sons did enlist, and his son Jan died on the eastern front in April of 
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1945.33 Immediately following his release from the concentration camp the Allies made 
him one of their own prisoners in their military HQ in Naples, thus beginning his bitter 
relationship with the Military Government.34 He was flown around Europe to give advice 
to occupation authorities, and was only set free when he protested his detention with a 
hunger strike.35  
Although Niemöller had been both an opponent and a victim of Nazism, he 
refused to dwell on his suffering, preaching that he had not been mistreated, and that he 
had believed the brutality he had witnessed to be isolated acts.36 Instead, Niemöller 
acknowledged his own guilt in not fighting hard enough against Nazism. Niemöller felt 
that he should have been in prison as early as 1933, and that until 1937 he had only been 
against the policies that affected the independence of the Church, instead of having had a 
broader political quarrel.37 Although a critic of Allied policy, Niemöller often focused 
more on collective guilt, arguing simply that “[w]e Christians must accept this guilt and 
confess it… Because we Christians in Germany have incurred guilt” and recounting that 
“[t]here is much crying and lamenting about our hunger and affliction…but I have not yet 
heard one man in Germany, whether from the pulpit or anywhere else, express regret for 
the terrible suffering that we, we Germans, have brought upon others.”38 In 1946, Martin 
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Niemöller fully outlined his views on collective guilt in a book that would reach an 
international audience titled Of Guilt and Hope. In it, he calls for an open confession of 
all Germans to anyone who suffered under National Socialism. He wrote that a 
confession to God was the place to start, but that “[n]evertheless, we cannot find peace 
with God if we refuse to confess our guilt to people who suffered because of it.”39 This 
open admission of his guilt, as well as the profession of the guilt of all Germans, helped 
Niemöller’s standing as a popular international figure, but at home his remarks were 
greeted with hostility, and he was labelled a “tool of the Allies.”40 Other stances he took 
were popular at home and not with the Allies, as we will see with denazification: in 
discussing his opinion on the subject, Niemöller repeated Augustine’s remark that the 
Church should “hate the sin, but love the sinner.”41 Niemöller was a strongly principled 
figure, and never bent his beliefs to support what was popular. 
Like Karl Barth, the mainstream Lutheran Church labelled Niemöller a ‘radical’, as 
he wanted to turn Lutheranism into an entirely non-hierarchical church structure, and 
merge the German denominations.42 This extended to his opining that Theophil Wurm, 
Hans Meiser, and Otto Dibelius should not continue to use the title “Bishop” after the 
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Treysa meeting.43 Although he and Barth held different theological views, they were in 
agreement for how the Church should help shape the social and political landscape of 
post-war Germany. 
Niemöller’s most well known work is a short poem that he rewrote several times, a 
poem that serves both as a warning and an expression of guilt called First they came… 
All versions follow the same format, with the specific people “they came for” 
interchangeable: “First they came for the socialists, and I did not speak out because I was 
not a socialist. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I did not speak out because I 
was not a trade unionist. Then they came for the Jews, and I did not speak out because I 
was not a Jew. And then they came for me, and there was nobody left to speak for me.” 
This honest and pointedly personal admission of guilt made him popular internationally, 
and he made a habit of talking about guilt often in personal terms. This put him in stark 
contrast with other church leaders, such as Hans Asmussen, who spoke of guilt in 
impersonal ecclesiastic language.44 
Although Niemöller often espoused that the Church should remain out of politics, in a 
letter written to his brother, Rev. Wilhelm Niemöller, on 10 November 1945, Martin 
Niemöller outlined a political function for the Church.45 He recognised that it was likely 
that the EKD would never become the Church of Germany, but that an independent EKD 
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could still exert influence if it governed its congregations by implementing the principles 
of the Barmen declaration.46 
Karl Barth was among the most respected names in Christian thought during his 
lifetime. A native of Switzerland who had dual German citizenship, Barth had spent the 
war in Switzerland after having refused to sign an oath to Hitler while teaching in Bonn. 
Barth had been a “major inspiration for the establishment of the Confessing Church at 
Barmen in 1934, and remained an important voice during the war.”47 The historian 
Matthew Hockenos summarised Barth’s theology as follows: 
 
through the incarnation, death, resurrection, and exaltation of Jesus Christ we 
experience God’s unconditional love and enter into a fellowship with God. This act of 
reconciliation of God and man in the spiritual kingdom, Barth contended, imparted to 
man the freedom to live according to God’s message of reconciliation in the earthly 
kingdom. Christian freedom was the freedom to act in the world as a disciple of 
Christ.48  
 
 
Barth was a Swiss Reformed theologian, which made him an outsider, as most of the 
other post-war church leaders were Lutheran. Theophil Wurm noted in his memoirs that 
Barth’s presence at the Treysa meeting sparked tension with some of the Lutherans, and 
although Barth was present at this and other meetings and continued to offer advice, he 
was never a member of the EKD.49  
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Barth’s views on denazification are a bit more complex than the other figures, due to 
his outsider status as a Swiss Reformed theologian. Like most of the Germans, Barth 
supported the policy of cleansing Germany of Nazism in principle, and rarely publicly 
spoke out against it, and when he did he only focused on specific problems. He did, 
however, eventually grow disillusioned with denazification, but he kept himself on the 
sidelines, focusing more on German guilt. He made his greatest contribution in this area 
on 8 April 1945, when he wrote a reply to the question posed by the Manchester Evening 
News “How Can the Germans be Cured?” In his reply, Barth accepted German collective 
guilt, and followed that up by saying that Germany should look to Switzerland for 
friendship “in spite of everything”, and that, like the Swiss, the Germans should “retire 
from the stage of history”.50 Barth included a negative interpretation of the Sonderweg, 
saying that the unique history of Germany had led to National Socialism.51 He argued 
that “the cure for the character of Germany must not only take account of the crass 
corruption of the Hitler period, but go back to the roots of the disease at the time of 
Bismarck and indeed of Frederick the Great.”52 The Allies, argued Barth, could cure the 
Germans by showing how gentlemen act when they are put in charge of a nation, and he 
called upon the British to lead by example.53 Towards the end of the war, when Nazi 
defeat began to appear certain, Barth changed his rhetoric – instead of attacking Nazism, 	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he began to preach that the Allies should not act bitterly towards the Germans.54 He 
maintained that only the Church, not the occupying Allies, had the ability to offer 
redemption for the sins of the Germans. 
Barth’s views on collective guilt were different from most of the other church 
leaders; he believed that Germans were all individually guilty, and was “very much in 
favor of the Germans, and I mean all Germans, admitting their responsibility for all that 
which happened since 1933.”55 Because he believed that all Germans were guilty, he 
believed that if denazification were to work in Germany it could never be completed, and 
would have to surpass reconstruction as the Allies’ principle goal. Barth’s views on 
collective guilt were a sore point for other church leaders and some revisionist historians, 
because they felt that he was preaching guilt to a people who had had to stay behind in 
Germany while he had been able to peacefully spend the war in Switzerland.56 Although 
Barth went to Germany several times in the early post-war years to gather information 
and attend meetings, he remained a resident of Switzerland after the war, where he led 
international church groups rallying against German rearmament.  
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Most of the other church leaders, such as Bishops Dibelius and Meiser, feared that 
if the Church became too involved with politics it would become a tool of Military 
Government. F.K. Otto Dibelius was sixty-five and looking towards retirement in 1945 
when he took the title of Bishop of Berlin-Brandenburg. It was a job that he had expected 
to be given to Niemöller, who had shocked everyone when he had decided to stay in 
Hesse. In 1933 Dibelius was one of the few church leaders to speak negatively to Hitler 
in an effort to warn against dictatorship, and was removed from his post in the Berlin-
Brandenburg Church.57 This led to him being removed from his office by the Nazis.58 
Although he had been strongly anti-Nazi, Bishop Dibelius had never spoken against anti-
Semitism, and he held anti-Semitic views that were common at that time and for men in 
his postion.59 Soon after the end of the war, in July 1945, Dibelius delivered a sermon in 
which he drew an analogy from the persecution of the Confessing Church to the 
persecution of the Jews in the book of Exodus. Even though he was comparing the 
struggle of which he had been a part with the Jews of the Old Testament, he never 
mentioned the fate of European Jewry in his sermon.60 
Another reoccurring figure in my research is Bishop Hans Meiser, the leader of 
the Bavarian synod, who, like Wurm, had been removed from office by the German 
Christians only to be reinstated by Hitler in response to protests from his parishioners. 
Meiser represented a minority faction of Lutherans who wanted to return to a form of 
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Protestantism where each denomination remained independent. This was the system that 
had existed before the Weimar Republic, under the Kaisers, and was antithetical to what 
Niemöller believed.  
Unlike other church leaders, Hans Asmussen had rejected Nazism from 1933, 
when he co-authored the essay “Word and Affirmation of Altona Pastors amid the Misery 
and Confusion of Public Life”. This put him in the position to co-author the Barmen 
declaration the next year with Karl Barth. Soon thereafter he lost his job as pastor and 
was subsequently imprisoned by the Nazis. Following the war, Asmussen returned to 
preach in Hamburg. He was a staunch supporter of the Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt, 
although he maintained that the guilt lay with the Church and was not collective, and he 
rejected the subsequent Darmstadt Declaration. 
The primary goal of the EKD was to take advantage of the post-war renewed 
interest in Christianity and to re-Christianise Germany. One of the recurring points 
stressed by several church leaders, both Protestant and Catholic, was that the war, and 
indeed and all modern destruction, was a result of Europe’s moving away from Christian 
principles in favour of secularisation. They argued that this trend had begun with the 
Enlightenment and the French Revolution, and that with the end of Nazism the Church 
now had their chance to again lead the country to a return to Christian morality. This 
belief made it possible for churches to avoid a break from the past, as it portrayed 
churches as always having been right and venerable. It was because society had failed to 
conform to Church ideals that it had been led to the evils of the war and National 
Socialism.  
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Pastor Helmut Thielicke was one of the pastors who held this belief. He rejected 
German collective guilt, instead “attributing the guilt to the secularisation of all peoples.” 
Thielicke became a strong opponent of the collective guilt thesis, and often took on his 
former teacher Karl Barth. He argued that, as a Swiss citizen, Barth could not understand 
what it meant to live in a nation whose industry lies idle and which experiences “cultural 
bolshevism of a foreign spirit.”61 When he wrote his memoirs in 1984, Thielicke 
reiterated his criticisms of denazification, and wrote that the process made the Germans 
incapable of mourning. To become thoroughly denazified and avoid harsh sentencing, 
Germans would have to convince the tribunals, as well as themselves, that they had acted 
correctly during the war, which, he argued, made them unable to evaluate their 
relationship to the guilt of the Reich.62 Thielicke was the youngest of the key figures in 
the Lutheran Church, and was thirty-seven in 1945. Up until 1940, he had been at the 
university of Heidelberg as a professor of theology, but like several other church leaders 
was dismissed by the Nazis.63 
The final figure worth examining at this juncture is Hermann Diem, the only 
Confessing Church leader who vocally supported denazification. He further accused the 
EKD, of which he was a member, of acting like a business owner who defends its 
employees because that is what is good for business, and suggested that instead of 
fighting denazification it should set an example by submitting its own members to it.64 
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He wrote a short book expressing his stance in mid 1946, the title translating to The 
Church and Denazification: A memoir of the Church – Theological Society at 
Württemberg. A firm believer in the collective guilt thesis, his correspondence on the 
issue with Helmut Thielicke, another popular theologian, was published and widely read 
in 1948. In 1947, however, he did admit that the Allies had missed their chance with 
denazification, and he saw the process as having failed.65  
I have shown how opinions differed among these church leaders, and that is 
important to keep in mind when reading the rest of this dissertation. In Matthew 
Hockenos’ book A Church Divided he discusses the post-war differences in theology over 
guilt questions – this is not my aim, but is of course important in understanding the 
Protestant response to denazification. These leaders were not unified in the way they 
approached the subject – Hermann Diem, as illustrated, actually supported denazification 
initially, and Karl Barth was never a vocal critic of it. The EKD was a marriage between 
many of the Protestant leaders, but even the top ranking members, Wurm and Niemöller, 
did not think about denazification the same way. All of these church leaders had some 
anti-Nazi credentials, and claimed to be speaking for the Confessing Church. I will argue 
that denazification was doomed because it was a bad policy, not because the Church was 
against it, and at best they simply brought it to a quicker end. 
This information brings us up to mid-1945, and introduces the central figures and 
their relationship to one another. I will go into the meeting that was held between these 
figures at Treysa to form the EKD in the next chapter, when it comes up in the 
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chronology. From now on, its efforts to bring down denazification need to be examined; 
to do this, I will first take time to define the occupation of Germany and how 
denazification operated within it.  
Denazification in the four Zones 
The Potsdam Conference in July 1945 established how Germany was to be 
divided by the Allies. Denazification was among the issues brought up, and all four zones 
were bound by the final Potsdam agreement, which stipulated that   
 
All members of the Nazi Party who have been more than nominal participants in its 
activities and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes shall be removed from 
public and semi-public office, and from positions of responsibility in important 
private undertakings.66 
  
 
The vagueness of this denazification passage led to the process being 
implemented and carried out in widely different ways in each of the four zones.67 The 
United States in its zone tried almost ten times more Germans through denazification 
than were tried in any other zone, with a total of 169,282 cases. The Soviet Union and 
France tried 18,328 and 17,353 cases, respectively, while Britain led a more focused 
version that resulted in the denazification of only 2,296 Germans.68 Denazification 
proved to be of a lower priority to the other occupiers, but to the United States it was a 
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core policy, one of its “four D’s”: denazification, demilitarisation, decartelisation, and 
democratisation.69 
I want to distinguish between each of the four zones in an attempt to show what  
was unique to the American occupation, and what was similar throughout Germany. 
Every zone had denazification responsibilities, as I have already explained, but there 
were also problems of sustenance, health, rubble, cold, and housing exacerbated by the 
Allies evicting Germans in order to live and establish offices in their houses. Although 
they were attempting to fix these problems, there was little pity for the plight of the 
Germans, because, as the historian Richard Bessel wrote, “[t]he Germans, collectively, 
were viewed not just as a conquered people but also as morally bankrupt and guilty of 
unspeakable crimes.”70 
The American Zone was fortunate in the fact that the United States came out of 
the war with its economy fundamentally intact. The zone remained somewhat 
industrialised despite the fact that Germany had been so heavily bombed, with Lucius 
Clay putting the figure of surviving industry as high as 25-30%.71 These circumstances 
made the American Zone the zone with the strongest economy. Over the next years of 
occupation Military Government reorganised many of the zone’s economic and political 
institutions, as well as influenced the culture, in what became known as the 
Americanisation of Germany. Michael Ermarth listed a few of the “beneficial reforms of 
the American military government”, including “the democratization of the press, the 
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reform of the radio broadcasting system, the ‘America Houses’, which helped to foster 
cultural understanding and reorientation, and exchange programmes, not to mention the 
restoration of human values such as decency, honesty, and moral courage.”72  
However, the occupation was harsh, denazification and automatic arrest were far-
reaching, and despite the economic, political, and cultural institutions brought to the 
Germans by the United States, the Germans were not particularly happy to have the 
Americans as occupiers. One of the earliest policies of Military Government was the 
official ban on American soldiers fraternising with the Germans in any way – from 
forming friendships to offering a handshake. This was extended to mean that Germans 
could not live in the same building as an American, a particularly harsh measure when 
the rates of homelessness were so high.73  This prohibition of fraternisation has been 
described as “perfectly ineffective” and “the most ignored rule ever published by an 
American administration,” and was soon relaxed.74 
Although this dissertation focuses primarily on the Protestant perspective, it is 
important to keep in mind that the geographical area that the United States occupied was, 
presently and historically, predominantly Catholic.75 The Catholic Church’s leadership 
had a good relationship with the Military Government, and this can partly be explained 
by the fact that the Catholic Church had a “group-consciousness.” Protestants, in contrast, 
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often splinter into smaller denominations, and as a result this relationship with Military 
Government was often more complicated. It is also important to keep in mind that more 
Protestant leaders had been tainted by the Third Reich and were now seen as politically 
toxic.76 The American Zone also had the largest number of Jews in the post-war period. 
There do not seem to be good statistics, but there were around 250,000 in the British and 
American Zones, mostly Eastern European Jews.77 The local Germans (and even some of 
the Americans) often met these Jews with hostility.78 Likewise, there were a number of 
Jewish Americans who were there as occupiers, who showed hostility towards the 
Germans. 
In contrast with the American Zone, The British Zone was responsible for the 
highest population of Germans, twenty three million, in what was seen to be the worst 
sector in terms of destroyed infrastructure and refugees. The British were probably the 
most liked of all four occupying countries, and they favoured re-education over 
denazification. They were committed to denazification, but unlike the United States, gave 
absolute priority in denazification by going after the serious offenders first, and ended up 
prosecuting the fewest Parteigenosse (PGs, or Nazi Party member) of any of the zones.79 
From a superficial level, the processes were similar – there were Fragebogen 
(denazification questionnaires), the same five classifications, and in early 1946 a German 
administration handling the process, but the Atlee government was opposed to a wide-
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ranging purge, the idea being that the British would focus on those seeking employment 
in public offices. The Atlee government had too many domestic issues brought about by 
the war to be able to focus as heavily as the United States on denazification. The 
authorities of this zone were alone in refusing to restrict any Church activities and 
allowing the Church complete independence during denazification.80 Britain was the last 
ally to formally end its denazification programme, doing so soon after the United States 
in June of 1948.81 
Unlike the Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States, France was the only 
country that occupied Germany that had been defeated by the Nazis. To them occupation 
was not merely an exercise in justice – they knew that they were going to continue to be 
Germany’s neighbours after the occupation ended, and were therefore looking for a way 
to check German aggression for the rest of history.82 The French Military Government 
was largely indifferent to differences between Nazis and non-Nazis, to be German was 
crime enough, so it did little to denazify its sector.83 It was a particularly corrupt zone, 
one that was full of violence, forced labour, and rape, but after 1948 the French 
authorities called for a stronger Germany.84 Unlike the other Allies, France was not 
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invited to Potsdam, and “did not regard themselves as bound by the Potsdam Agreement 
and kept their Zone largely closed to the stream of refugees.”85 
The former Hitler Youth leader Alfons Heck refers to his captivity in the French 
zone by telling a story of how he and thirty others were told by French officers that they 
were going to be publicly executed. The execution never happened, but rather was an 
attempt to put fear into these men. Six months later he appeared before a French 
denazification board, where they punished him to a short stint of forced labour.86 
As might be expected, denazification was handled in a radically different manner 
in the Soviet Zone. The Soviets were firm believers in the collective guilt of Germans, 
and were ready to carry out death sentences as punishment for this guilt. Germans were 
forced to work and given “as little as [was needed] to sustain life.”87 The denazification 
process itself is actually viewed as having been more successful than in other zones, as it 
“operated with the Marxist theory of Fascism” and was used to eliminate social groups 
that had given the Nazis access to power, such as landowners and industrialists.88 As a 
result of having these clear goals, denazification was finished in this zone by August of 
1947.89 The Soviets also set up post-war political parties before any of the democratic 
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Allies, although they made sure to ally their zone’s communist party with their own, 
ensuring hegemonic influence.90 Their ultimate plan was to politically “incorporate as 
much of Germany as they controlled – and they would have liked to control it all – in 
their Communist Empire.”91 
This lack of uniformity between the four zones was described by Walter Dorn, 
who was a special advisor to Clay on denazification and a former and future Columbia 
University professor of history, as one of the reasons that denazification became so 
unpopular with the German population. According to Dorn, the differences allowed for “a 
former Party member to be an offender in one zone [and] acceptable for high political 
office in another zone.”92 Although the Allied Control Council in Berlin issued directives 
with the aim to unite the policies, these proved to be ineffective.  
Workings of Church and State 
The denazification process was the only major area of disagreement in occupation 
policy between the Military Government’s of the United States and Britain and the 
leaders of the EKD. Because the former Confessing Church had been able to maintain 
independence from National Socialism and was experiencing an increase in popularity 
among Germans in the post-war era it was in a position to help Allied efforts. This 
included helping to distribute material goods, financial assistance, educational services, 
and food. Karl Barth, Theophil Wurm, and Martin Niemöller, amongst others, were 
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generally highly respected by the occupying Allies for their roles in standing up to 
National Socialism, and were given special treatment by the Allies.93 An officer on 
Eisenhower’s staff, speaking about Wurm and Niemöller, stated that  
 
[b]oth are, I believe, ardent German patriots who have violently disagreed with 
policies of the National Socialist party in the past but who are also capable of similar 
violent disagreement with the Allied occupation authorities… there is doubt in the 
minds of some of our officers who have contacted them that the relations with them 
in the future will be entirely smooth and easy.94 
 
 In Lucius Clay’s memoir Decision in Germany he wrote on a more positive note that  
 
Ecclesiastical leaders are replaying an active role in German life, and the return to 
religion is marked. In general the co-operation of church leaders with Military 
Government has been genuine and helpful. Bishop Wurm and later Bishop Otto 
Dibelius, who succeeded Bishop Wurm as chairman of the Council of the Evangelical 
Church, frequently and publicly expressed their appreciation of United States aid. The 
conference of Catholic bishops did likewise…95 
 
 
Outside of denazification policy, the EKD and the Military Government had a 
good working relationship, one based on trust and communication. The United States had 
its tradition of separation of church and state, and therefore the relationship was a bit less 
natural than it was in other zones, however, for the most part they managed to make it 
work. One SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force) handbook 
explicitly stated that church leaders were to be treated with “deference and respect” and 
that churches were to be consulted in correlation with “appropriate community 	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problems”.96 It was a relationship that was inarguably mutually beneficial. Churches 
preached Allied goals to their parishioners, and had their own reasons to work towards 
politically, morally, and spiritually “curing” Germany of Nazism.97  
As a reward for their collaboration, and in response to Niemöller, Wurm, and 
Meiser arguing that secular powers should not have a role in determining Church matters, 
churches were allowed to denazify on their own, with different standards set in place in 
each of the different occupation zones.98 According to Walter Dorn, the Catholic Church 
did not “cause any difficulties in the matter of purging itself of active Nazi priests.”99 
However, the EKD abused the international credibility that it had gained from the 
Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt by using its privileged position in regard to denazification 
to focus on the guilt “German Christians”, rather than those who had been in the 
Confessing Church.100 
For the most part, they had already purged the ecclesiastical administration by 
May of 1945, having started when defeat had become inevitable. The fact that many 
members of the Confessing Church had been supporters of the National Socialism, or that 
most of the members of the German Christians had not been members of the Nazi party 	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did not factor into the in-house denazification policy. After the war, in Wurm’s synod 
alone, 333 of the 1197 pastors had belonged to a Nazi affiliated organisation. 
Although they were allowed independence, only after heavy pressure came from 
Military Government did any sort of self-cleansing take place in the Church, and this 
itself was limited. One particularly bad example of a pastor who was protected by 
Wurm and given a pastorate in Eutin was Hugo Rönck, who had said in 1944, 
“Adolf Hitler is our example of Lutheran piety, he is truly the leader of God's 
grace. His order is directly from God, and his command is the command of God.”101 
Wurm tried to defend many of the pastors’ support for Hitler by referring Clay to a 
passage of Mein Kampf in which “Hitler had written that National Socialism and 
Christianity could work together.” Clay, who knew that many Protestant clergy had 
joined the party and, in some cases, the SS, disagreed with Wurm.102 Although in the 
British and French Zones there was little to no intervention by the occupying military in 
church staffing, the United States would, in extreme cases, remove church leaders if the 
Church would not remove them itself.103 Another important factor was that in the 
American Zone, there was a relatively low number of clergymen, about ten thousand total 
- Catholic and Protestant - that meant that more attention could be paid to each clergy 
member individually.104  	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The fact that the EKD had not chosen to use its privileged position in regard to 
denazification to honestly assess its own sins and hold itself accountable was 
acknowledged by Military Government in December of 1945, when General Clay 
informed the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States that the 
Church was pushing a soft peace and proving “reluctant to denazify itself.”105  
For the most part, none of the administrators of the western zones interfered with 
the churches, allowing them to assemble and collect their own fees and reopen 
seminaries, as well as restoring church property that had been confiscated by the Nazis.106 
The Church’s position in regards to the state was not affected. But despite being allowed 
to denazify itself, denazification soon became a nonnegotiable issue for the churches. 
Bishop Hans Meiser defended churches retention of corrupted pastors, saying that the 
Church “would cease to be a church if it veered with every political wind that blew and 
inaugurated a sort of ‘spoils system’ in ecclesiastical incumbencies.” He then extended 
his anti denazification stance by saying that the Church “is no less obliged to extend its 
doctrine of forgiveness to its pastors, if they are penitent, than to its ordinary 
members.”107 In his memoirs Lucius Clay noticed: 
 
Perhaps the only major difference with church leaders came about from the open 
opposition of some of the leaders in the Evangelical Church to our denazification 
program and to the exclusion of Nazi clergymen from further pastoral activities. We 
were forced to carry out the program without the co-operation which we should have 
received from them.108  	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Despite these facts, a majority of German political leaders and denazification 
authorities believed by 1946 that “the church had been adequately cleared of Nazis”, 
especially when compared with business and industry.109  
With the post-war church and state landscapes having been given a foundational 
introduction, a tighter examination of how the religious leaders dealt with the practice of 
denazification by the American Zone’s Military Government can begin. 
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Chapter 2 
Terror: Military Government and Denazification, May 1945 – March 1946 
 
“No victor was ever more generous to a vanquished nation than was the United 
States to Germany after the Second World War. We were starving and our cities 
were in ruins; the Americans gave us food and the materials to begin 
reconstruction. The French committed atrocities, lived off the land and removed 
whatever they could get their hands on. But American denazification procedures 
so poisoned the atmosphere that to this day the people of Wuertemberg feel 
friendlier to the French than to the Americans.”1 
- Bishop Martin Haug  
 
“No one who really is guilty should escape his punishment, but to lock up 
hundreds of thousands of people in order to detect one hundred of the guilty is 
more than makes sense.”2 
- Bishop Theophil Wurm, “To The 
Christians in England”, 1945 
 
 
The first problem with the denazification policy was that originally the United 
States was not following one programme, but rather three, all of which had varying 
levels of approval and implementation by Military Government; there was a chapter 
from the Handbook for Military Government, a SHAEF directive from 9 November 
1944, and JCS 1067, which had two different versions of denazification policies 
between two different circulated drafts.3 While all of them agreed on the larger 
picture of removing former Nazis from power, they contradicted each other on 
important details – for example, how to define Nazi Party membership. The historian 
Harold Zink has noted that “[i]t is true that the development of American plans in the 
denazification field did not proceed in an orderly fashion and that they were in large 
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measure influenced, if not entirely controlled, by strong political pressures in the 
United States.”4 
Ultimately it was the texts used in section C of denazification as outlined by JCS 
1067 that defined the process and therefore it is worth reviewing them and noticing 
the similarities to what was said at Potsdam on the same issue: 
 
All members of the Nazi party who have been more than nominal participants in its 
activities, all active supporters of Nazism or militarism and all other persons hostile 
to Allied purposes will be removed and excluded from public office and from 
positions of importance in quasi-public and private enterprises such as (1) civic, 
economic and labour organizations, (2) corporations and other organizations in 
which the German government or subdivisions have a major financial interest, (3) 
industry, commerce, agriculture, and finance, (4) education, and (5) the press, 
publishing houses and other agencies disseminating news and propaganda. Persons 
are to be treated as more than nominal participants in Party activities and as active 
supporters of Nazism or militarism when they have (1) held office or otherwise 
been active at any level from local to national in the party and its subordinate 
organizations, or in organizations which further militaristic doctrines, (2) authorized 
or participated affirmatively in any Nazi crimes, racial persecutions or 
discriminations, (3) been avowed believers in Nazism or racial and militaristic 
creeds, or (4) voluntarily given substantial moral or material support or political 
assistance of any kind to the Nazi Party or Nazi officials and leaders. No such 
persons shall be retained in any of the categories of employment listed above 
because of administrative necessity, convenience or expediency.5 
 
 
The German officials immediately after the war “were appointees of the 
occupying authority and were neither selected by nor responsible for the German 
people. [Military Government] had set the stage for democratic government but had 
given it no life. Administration in itself was only a means to an end, the creation of 
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responsible German Government.”6 In the context of JCS 1067 this makes sense, but 
it is important to understand how the Germans could make known their grievances 
towards denazification, as well as a host of other Military Government policies. The 
end of Nazism had left a political vacuum, and the hope was to quickly find political 
leadership that had not been tainted by Nazism. Therefore, all of the officials in 
Germany had to have a clean record or be in some way denazified. 
Military Government, specifically the Special Branch of the Public Safety Branch 
with aid from the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC), administered the first phase of 
the United States Zone policy of denazification, which lasted until March of 1946.7 
The process was unprecedented. Denazifying the American Zone constituted, in the 
words of Michael Ermath, “the most extensive legal procedure of inquiry and 
punishment ever undertaken in history.”8 Over 3.5 million Germans in the American 
Zone had been Nazi party members, and millions more belonged to affiliated Nazi 
organisations.9 In practice, it meant removing thousands of people from office, 
putting more in displaced person camps to await their trials, and forcing hundreds of 
thousands of Germans to appear before a court. Although it required large amounts of 
manpower and resources, “[t]he fact that the United States had little in the way of 
facilities for administering such a purge of Nazism apparently received no attention at 
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all.”10At first, denazification was popular among the angry and disillusioned German 
public, who were more than happy to witness the fall of former Nazi leaders, but as in 
other areas of Allied policy they soon began to see themselves as victims.11   
In April 1945, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) 
issued its Arrest Categories Handbook, which contained lists of everyone who was to 
be “arrested and detained as dangerous to the security of the Allied Forces in 
Germany.”12 This policy of Automatic Arrest included all members of Nazi affiliated 
organisations, as well as party members who had worked for the state, including 
schoolteachers (primary and secondary) and low-level bureaucrats who had been 
clerks at railroads or post offices.13 In the American Zone, this resulted in 117,500 
Germans being interned – roughly “one of every 142 inhabitants.”14 The historian 
John Kormann, writing in 1952 for the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for 
Germany, went as far as to refer to the first few months of denazification as a “small 
scale reign of terror,” as the people mentioned on this list were automatically arrested 
as soon as they could be identified.15 Once these PGs were arrested, they were placed 
into camps, where they waited until they were called to be tried before a 
Spruchkammer. These camps varied in character, but often they lacked access to basic 
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food and medical supplies, as well as the ability of the PGs to keep in contact with the 
outside world. With over one hundred thousand internees, the United States had to be 
resourceful in creating space for the interned Germans, and went as far as to use the 
Dachau concentration camp for this purpose.16 
In addition to automatic arrest, every German over eighteen looking for work 
was issued a Frageboge, a questionnaire that sought to “determine their degree of 
collaboration” with the Nazis.17 These Fragebogen consisted of one hundred and 
thirty one questions over six pages. The questionnaire asked for basic information 
like the schools attended or date of birth or hair colour, as well as asking questions 
that attempted to establish whether or not the person filling out the Frageboge had 
served in the Wehrmacht or had ever stolen Jewish property.18 When a Frageboge 
was completed, Special Branch would then classify the person surveyed into one of 
five different classifications:  
 
“Mandatory Removal”, “Discretionary Removal – Adverse Recommendation”, 
“Discretionary Removal – No Adverse Recommendation”, “No Evidence of Nazi 
Activity”, or “Evidence of Anti-Nazi Activity”.19 
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These classifications were given by the American judges administering 
denazification, and were largely procedural. George Wham described filling in for a 
judge friend of his in Karlsruhe after Military Law No. 8 had passed, saying that his 
friend had written “up a list of [what] the penalties should be and said if there was 
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These classifications were determined by how long one had been a member of 
the Nazi party, the office held and economic gains from the holding of office, as well 
as other information in the Fragebogen.20 Critics argued that these classifications 
were somewhat arbitrary, as few Allied officials were fluent in German, “and fewer 
still understood the nuances of the Nazi rank order.”21 When the Frageboge was 
completed, Germans would have to appear before special courts called the 
Spruchkammern where they would either have to try to prove that they had never 
been Nazis or give evidence that would explain that they had merely joined the party 
but had never actually been an active member. As can be surmised, there was an 
immense workload for the Special Branch officers who had to examine and classify 
each of these Fragebogen. 
There were several penalties for PGs who either falsified or withheld 
information on their Frageboge, and as the Nazis had kept good records it was not 
difficult to find accurate information.22 Military Government alerted the Germans of 
this fact through newspapers, although critics claimed that this therefore meant that 
the Fragebogen were a way to get former Nazis to incriminate themselves.23  
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One of the problems with these penalties, and all of the denazification 
penalties, was that when someone was fined, the fines took no account of the now 
worthless post-war currency in Germany. Currency reform would not take place until 
1948, and in the interim, the fines seemed arbitrary. The standard fine was fifty Reich 
Marks, which once might have constituted two weeks labour, but was now equal to 
about a day’s supply of cigarettes.24 
This process was not only time consuming but also required an extensive 
amount of personnel to assign and collect the Fragebogen, and then to check them 
against other records. Many of the Americans had a poor understanding of the 
German language and had not been trained for this type of work. Military 
Government had other concerns, such as public safety and economic rebuilding, but 
the large bureaucracy needed for denazification demanded much of the manpower. As 
it stood, denazification was unsustainable – progress was slow but steady, as 
American troops did manage to review around 1.6 million Fragebogen, but as time 
passed the military priority became demobilisation and returning soldiers to the 
United States.25 In the next chapter I will explore the reforms of 1946 that from the 
beginning looked inevitable. 
There was a popular backlash against the Fragebogen, especially from the 
leadership of the EKD. In Berlin, when Bishop Dibelius received his Frageboge he 
complained that there were too many questions, over one hundred, and that several, 
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such as the height and weight, were trivial.  He told the visiting British Council of 
Churches that “[h]e had refused to answer and returned it”.26 
In a letter to General John H. Hilldring describing how denazification was 
moving in the first few months, Clay wrote that “[i]n some areas such as Aachen and 
Cologne [cities in the British Zone that were amongst the first to be taken by the 
Allies] the screening process is virtually completed. Less progress has been made in 
Wuertemberg and Bavaria” and further hints that there are “steps under way to train 
reliable German personnel to assist in screening programme and by issuance of 
clarified removal directive in US zone”.27 
An early and important opponent of Military Government’s denazification 
policy was General George Patton, the Military Governor for Bavaria, who was 
reported to have stated that Nazis and Anti-Nazis in Germany could be compared to 
Republicans and Democrats back in the United States.28 Patton was famous for his 
aptitude in the field, but he had little peacetime administrative ability, and had grown 
to believe that Germany could not be run without the help of the Nazis, so he had 
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worked to defend the ones he needed.29 General Dwight Eisenhower, a genuine 
supporter of denazification, had little patience for Patton’s attitude, telling him on 27 
August  “to get off [his] bloody ass and carry out the denazification process instead of 
mollycoddling the goddamn Nazis.”30 Patton was soon relieved of his command by 
Eisenhower, and the deputy military governor Lucius Clay announced that Germans 
were going to be tried regardless of Patton’s remarks. This had two effects – seeing a 
celebrated four star general stripped of his position caused other officers who had 
objected to denazification to fall in line, but the German people had witnessed a lack 
of unity from the Military Government on denazification. Patton had not been taking 
denazification lightly, but instead came from a point of pragmatism, and 
acknowledged what many of his fellow officers were already thinking: that the United 
States would need former Nazis to rebuild its zone.31 Much press was given to his 
remarks, and following this episode, Military Government was forced into a position 
where it had to be extremely vocal about stressing the need for denazification and 
German guilt, and in turn stricter sentences were handed down by the tribunals. This 
was a reactive position, and as the historian James Tent put it, “all hope for an orderly 
denazification had vanished.”32 
 Patton’s attitude towards denazification became well known, but other 
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Education & Religious Affairs Branch, were similarly apprehensive. His book on the 
subject, And Call it Peace, was published in 1947, and in it he showed how his views 
differed from Military Government’s by saying 
Others, like myself, citing the German election returns in the 1919-33 period 
asserted that the only effective denazification procedure was to give the German a 
job at steady wages which would take his mind off parading and putsching.33 
 
Shortly after the Patton incident, on 26 September 1945, Military Government 
passed Law No. 8, a law meant to purify the German economy which made it illegal 
for private businesses to be managed, owned, or to employ those who had, based on 
their answers to their Frageboge, been determined to be in need of denazification. 
Law No. 8 was a legal decree, written with the hope that those who had been barred 
from government work would not instead go on to run Germany’s economy.34 The 
law’s effect was that former party members could only hold the most menial jobs. It 
also required Arbeitsaemter, or local German labour offices, to submit a monthly list 
“of employees” and their “National Socialist affiliations.” Military Government also 
performed spot checks to ensure that the law was being followed.35 Law No. 8 greatly 
increased the size and scope of denazification. This was the harshest measure 
introduced by Military Government, and many Germans feared that the Morgenthau 
Plan was being revived.36 
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Like denazification as a whole, Law No. 8 has been since been dubbed “an 
appalling mistake” by subsequent historians, and was at the time by some 
contemporaries.37 The Chief Information Officer for the United States, Colonel B. B. 
McMahon, told a British official the following year “[w]e have done a good job of 
kicking in the teeth of everyone who could have been helpful.” He called it 
“indiscriminate punishment of those who had joined the party to keep their jobs 
[Mussnazis], or because they were too weak to resist social pressures, made enemies 
out of potential Allies…[and] it did more: it has [provided] both respectability and 
massive support to the opponents of denazification, who were almost invariably Nazis 
themselves, and to those who opposed the prosecution of war criminals.”38  
Other Military Government officers were able to see these flaws before 
McMahon. In October of 1945, Major George Wham wrote in his monthly economic 
report a critique of the law, saying that  
 
There was much despair among the business groups and many feared that more 
complete collapse than already existed of the economic system would follow. 
Many reliable persons pointed out that the majority of the good business men 
were forced to join the party in order to earn their livelihood and now that Law 
No. 8 had forced the mass exodus of these people their positions were being taken 
over in many cases by the incompetent ‘get rich quick’ group who have only 
personal interests at heart.39 
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This rhetoric was reiterated and exaggerated in German economic circles, which 
claimed that the law would bring economic collapse. Only the labour unions in 
Germany were in favour of the law, and they expressed a desire to play a bigger role 
in purging National Socialism.40 
From the EKD Theophil Wurm as usual led the attacks against Law No. 8; in 
a statement addressed to General Clay on 3 October, “Wurm complained about the 
arbitrariness of Law Number 8, arguing that it posed ‘a question of life and death’ to 
the German people, and contending that German bureaucrats had a reputation for 
apolitical incorruptibility, whether or not they were formally Parteigenossen [party 
members or PGs]. Most of these men, he added, had been Mussnazis, and their 
release from employment was not only unfair, but a breach of traditional German 
laws that guaranteed their seniority.” This was exactly what the Nazis had done, to 
take away privileges of Jews and Socialists.41 
In the end, the law did little to change the situation in Germany. Germans 
found ways of avoiding the penalties through “various subterfuges, particularly the 
sale of firms to the sons and wives of affected persons… Other firms would fire and 
rehire the same staff members with different titles. In total only one hundred thousand 
people were dismissed from work, a number Military Government regarded as 
‘inconsequential.’”42 Germans were allowed to establish appeal boards, marking the 
first time they were allowed to have a say in the denazification proceedings. These 
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boards were popular among Germans; however, this was only a minor concession 
from Military Government.43 
Shortly before Military Law No. 8 was passed, when the Confessing Church 
lay in ruins in August 1945, the heads of the Protestant churches met in Treysa to 
organise reconciliation between the various churches. The Allies had been impressed 
with the work of the Confessing Church, and as Germany had no other voice to 
communicate with the international community, granted permission for this 
meeting.44 At Treysa, the Deutsche Evangelische Kirche reformed under the name 
Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland, or Evangelical Church of Germany (EKD), in 
order to place emphasis on being a church organisation and not in essence a German 
one.45 The goal of the institution was to develop an umbrella organisation of German 
Protestants. The Treysa meeting was a uniquely Protestant event, as the Catholic 
Church, with its innate hierarchical and institutional structure that it believed was not 
in need of reformation after the war, did not hold a similar meeting. The questions the 
EKD faced at Treysa were great, and divisions among the leadership remained, but 
the leaders were able to form a united church that is still the largest organisation of 
Protestants in Germany today. Around fifty church leaders from all four zones were 
invited to take part, all of whom had at one point shown resistance to Nazism.46 No 
members of the occupying authorities were invited to attend the meeting, however, 
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Stewart Hermann and Karl Barth were present without being affiliated with the EKD. 
The hierarchy of the EKD was ultimately structured as a twelve-member council, 
with the elderly Bishop Theophil Wurm as the chairman and Pastor Martin Niemöller 
serving as Vice President.47 These two had been rival leaders in the Confessing 
Church, and had only reconnected after the war had ended.48  
The meeting was given Allied approval, as the occupiers wanted to see 
Christianity bring Germany away from its Nazi tendencies and fashion it into a more 
moral and humane nation. However, the EKD quickly ran into trouble with the 
United States, which had little knowledge of the role the Protestant Church had 
played in Germany traditionally. Even the officers in the U.S. Religious Affairs 
Branch lacked good information, and they often mistranslated German church 
statements, causing further frustration.49 
From the beginning, the EKD was opposed to denazification, and discussed at 
length its objections to the denazification of German career soldiers, agreeing that 
they were only following the German military tradition, and that the soldiers were 
inherently apolitical. Soldiers of Martin Niemöller’s generation had not been allowed 
to vote, and they pointed to the history of antagonism between Hitler and the 
military.50 
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At the end of the meeting, the EKD published A Message to the 
Congregations, more commonly known as the “Treysa agreement”, which stressed 
the importance of putting aside theological differences and re-Christianising 
Germany. Essentially, this was an announcement that Christianity would save 
Germany, and this was heralding the “hour of the Church.” The message is also 
notable because it touches on the subject of guilt, with the EKD admitting, “[l]ong 
before God spoke in anger, He sought us with the Word of His love and we did not 
listen.”51 The guilt here is ambiguous – it is hard to tell whom the EKD is referring to 
when it says “us” and “we”, but it is clear that the guilt it is referring to is for the 
destruction of Germany from the Second World War. This, of course, would not be 
all the EKD had to say on the subject. 
One of the first acts of the newly formed EKD was to publicly take 
responsibility for the guilt of the leaders in inadequately responding to National 
Socialism, and they achieved this by publishing the Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt 
(Stuttgarter Schuldbekenntnis) on 18 October 1945, an admission of guilt on behalf of 
the churches for the crimes of the Nazis but also a plea for international support and 
sympathy.52 This was a highly controversial document that attempted to tackle both 
the Nazi past and a post-war Germany. This admission of guilt was made freely, as 
there is no evidence that the Allies or the international church community demanded 
the declaration in exchange for material goods. Bishops Wurm and Dibelius had 
understood the need to separate the Church from Nazism, but they feared the Allies 	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would justify punitive action by a confession of guilt. This would then lead to a 
negative reaction amongst their congregations. In contrast, Niemöller, Barth and 
Bishop Hans Asmussen were more worried about what the Church’s reputation would 
be if there was not an open and honest declaration of guilt. They argued that the 
Church had to be responsible in taking up the guilt question.53 There had been much 
soul searching amongst the EKD leadership, but ultimately the text was unanimously 
agreed upon and signed by the entire council leadership of the EKD. It was the 
attention that this declaration brought that made the EKD a key international post-war 
player with the ability to speak to the leadership of other countries on behalf of the 
German people.54 
The declaration was made publicly, and received the attention of Military 
Government. Five days before the declaration was made, on 13 October 1945, Lucius 
Clay wrote to Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson, saying  
 
German Protestant church leaders have continued conferences and discussions 
aimed at reorganization and reinvigoration of Protestant life in Germany. They are 
anxious to purge the German church of pro-Nazi elements which weakened it. To 
assist this process, World Council of Churches has suggested that prominent 
Protestant clergymen from United States, Great Britain, France, Norway, and 
Netherlands be allowed to come to Germany for intensive conferences with 
German church leaders. Transportation, lodging and food problems make 
practical application of this measure difficult but it is under sympathetic 
consideration as it is believed of utmost importance to bring democratic and well-
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disposed religious leaders in Germany into close and early contact with 
colleagues in democratic countries.55 
 
 
As Clay suggested, the Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt was written for an 
international audience. Martin Niemöller read the declaration to a packed church 
containing the leaders of the World Council of Churches, an international ecumenical 
council, with church leaders from France, Britain, the Netherlands, and the United 
States, all countries that the Germans had fought against, as well as a few Germans.56 
As Niemöller later wrote, it was specifically “a confession before God, our Lord, and 
before our Christian brothers against whom we have sinned,” with no mention of the 
sins committed against non-Christians.57 Hans Asmussen, the president of the EKD 
chancellery, called the declaration “a message from Christians to Christians” and said 
that [t]he Stuttgart Declaration does not take a position on the war guilt as such. Nor 
did it want to evaluate the question of guilt before the forum of the world or history, 
rather, as said, in the presence of God.”58 Asmussen told the other leaders of the EKD 
that the Stuttgart Declaration should not be “misused” to score political points, but 
rather should remain a theological confession, therefore making it an acceptance of 
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guilt without further consequences.59 The Stuttgart Declaration was not a zero hour, 
and the Church did not experience one in 1945; rather, this was a reorientation of old 
theological principles to the reality of the crimes and subsequent destruction of the 
Third Reich. The entire statement reads less than one page, and can be found in the 
appendix, but the most important passage states:  
 
We are all the more grateful for this visit, as we not only know that we are with 
our people in a large community of suffering, but also in a solidarity of guilt. 
With great pain we say: By us infinite wrong was brought over many peoples and 
countries. That which we often testified to in our communities, we express now in 
the name of the whole church: We did fight for long years in the name of Jesus 
Christ against the mentality that found its awful expression in the National 
Socialist regime of violence; but we accuse ourselves for not standing to our 
beliefs more courageously, for not praying more faithfully, for not believing more 
joyously, and for not loving more ardently.60 
 
 
To the dismay of church leaders, newspapers reported on the declaration with 
headlines such as “Evangelical Church Acknowledges War Guilt.”61 Abroad, this was 
viewed positively, as people in Great Britain and the United States took this to mean 	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der Schuld. Mit grossem Schmerz sagen wir: Durch uns ist unendliches Leid über 
viele Völker und Länder gebracht worden. Was wir unseren Gemeinden oft bezeugt 
haben, das sprechen wir jetzt im Namen der ganzen Kirche aus: Wohl haben wir 
lange Jahre hindurch im Namen Jesu Christi gegen den Geist gekämpft, der im 
nationalsozialistischen Gewaltregiment seinen furchtbaren Ausdruck gefunden hat; 
aber wir klagen uns an, dass wir nicht mutiger bekannt, nicht treuer gebetet, nicht 
fröhlicher geglaubt und nicht brennender geliebt haben. 
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the Germans were accepting their past; in Germany, the statement was seen to parallel 
Article 231 of the Versailles Treaty, which placed the blame of World War I on the 
Germans, and many feared similar reparations and humiliation would result.62 The 
German public was largely horrified by the statement, and felt that the EKD was out 
of touch with its parishioners.63 The reaction was especially negative amongst the 
youth in the American Zone, who took this admission of guilt to mean that the EKD 
was endorsing the denazification measures against them.64  
However, nowhere in the Stuttgart Declaration did the Church endorse the 
idea of collective guilt. Rather, the EKD used the ambiguous phrase “solidarity of 
guilt” and the plural “we” which the public equated with collective guilt of all 
Germans, while the EKD meant for the guilt to refer exclusively to the clergy.65 
Niemöller in particular believed that “pastors, theologians, and church leaders were 
more guilty than anyone else, because of all people, they should have known that the 
Nazis were leading Germany down the wrong path.”66 Due to the high volume of 
complaints, Asmussen wrote a commentary defending the declaration as an admission 
of church guilt, which helped to ease the minds of few protestors.67 Because of this 
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honest admission of the EKD leaders’ guilt and the ensuing complaints from the 
German public, the declaration was “simultaneously a public relations disaster and a 
stunning achievement for the leadership of the post-Nazi Protestant Church.”68  
In contrast, the Catholic Church had also organised a meeting of its bishops to 
discuss war guilt, and this group had also issued a statement. However, this was a 
much shorter statement, and in two sentences they put the guilt question to rest: 
 
We profoundly deplore the fact that many Germans, even in our own ranks, 
allowed themselves to be deceived by the false teachings of National Socialism, 
remained indifferent to the crimes against human freedom and human dignity; 
many by their attitude lent support to the crimes, many became criminals 
themselves. A heavy responsibility falls upon those who, because of their 
influence, could have prevented such crimes and did not do so but made these 
crimes possible and in this way associated themselves with the criminals.69 
 
 
The Catholic statement denied all responsibility collectively and individually, 
and depicted the Catholic Church as the single force that had fought back against the 
Nazis within Germany, with those who had fallen in line with the Nazis being bad 
exceptions. Of course, this was less than true, but the subject of guilt was something 
that most Germans avoided. Indeed, the Catholic Church was not alone in its denial – 
rather, the members of the council of the EKD were the single group inside of 
Germany to acknowledge its own guilt in 1945.70 Most individual Germans denied 
the validity of collective guilt.  
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Although they did not believe in collective guilt, it seems that many Germans 
in the American Zone might have agreed with the idea that the Church was guilty of 
not doing its utmost to prevent the evils of the Third Reich. In a 1946 Military 
Government survey of just under one thousand Germans in the American Zone, only 
forty seven per cent of regular church going Protestants felt that their church had done 
its “utmost to offer resistance to the National Socialists” while they were in power.71 
In the same survey, seventy per cent of Germans stated that “the church should be 
less interested in political affairs”.72 The idea of guilt - not just the ecclesiastical guilt 
as expressed through the Stuttgart Declaration but also the idea of collective guilt 
applied to the broader German public - is no longer controversial: it seems that by the 
1960s that many Germans accepted this view of their guilt.73 Later readers instead 
believed the declaration did not go far enough in the acceptance of German guilt, as it 
failed to mention ways the Church could prevent further atrocities, and included 
church resistance efforts while ignoring the fate of the Jews.74  
But even those who did support the Stuttgart Declaration often became a nuisance  
 
to the Allies because, as Biddiscombe observed, 
 
 
they could claim that they had freely accepted a great burden of guilt upon their 
own country, and should thus be at liberty to point out other injustices wherever 
they saw them. In fact, they noted that not speaking out against iniquities was 
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precisely their failing during the Third Reich, and that they had no intention of 
repeating this mistake.75 
 
 
To the international community, it was clear that the German people were not 
accepting of guilt, and that therefore the Stuttgart Declaration was exceptional. The 
newly appointed Archbishop of Canterbury, Geoffrey Fisher, broadcast a radio 
address to Germany on 28 November 1945, in which he called for true repentance 
from the German people, criticising the self-righteousness of the claims of 
victimhood coming out of Germany. He spoke, in English, in a tone of reconciliation, 
telling his audience that he came “with a heavy sense of responsibility,” and that he 
was only going to say what he thought “ought to be said and to say it in the right 
manner.”76 The Archbishop’s broadcast then went on to serve as a reminder to the 
Germans of the destruction they had brought to Europe, and why they should feel 
guilt.77 
In response to the Archbishop’s broadcast Theophil Wurm wrote an open letter 
titled “To the Christians in England” dated 14 December 1945.78 In it he thanked the 
Archbishop for addressing those whom his country had so recently defeated, the 
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Germans, as brothers. He reaffirmed the regret of the Church without explicitly 
admitting guilt, stating that it had been “a deep source of sorrow to us that we could 
not effectively prevent the gross ill-treatment of other peoples and countries,” and 
also defended the actions of the Church during the war, which caused it to be “hated 
by the National-Socialist leaders quite particularly because they were well aware of 
our condemnation of their misdeeds.” However, it becomes clear early on in the letter 
that Wurm is displeased with the tone of the Archbishop’s letter, writing that he 
agrees that the Germans cannot undo their past, and that he is painfully aware of that 
fact as all Germany’s cities were in ruin and his fellow countrymen were dying of 
starvation or in POW camps. Wurm then stated that the “victory of the Allied Powers 
was not simply the victory of good over evil”, criticising the occupiers for the forced 
migration of Germans from Eastern Europe and for the failings of denazification, 
arguing that the injustices of Germany were being paid back by greater injustices.79 
This sparked a further war of words, which showed that Wurm was already denying 
German guilt and that the Stuttgart Declaration would be far from the final word on 
that subject. Specifically, he asked 
 
Are the Germans alone to blame? Didn’t Russia also take part in the attack on 
Poland and lead its own attack against tiny Finland? Weren’t institutions similar 
to concentration camps established earlier by our eastern neighbours? Was it 
humane and Christian to pour fire from the sky onto German cities, especially 
when it had no military purpose whatsoever? Is the treatment of either our POWs, 
who are cut off from all contact with their homes or the deportation of our 
comrades from the east humane or Christian?80 
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He then attacked denazification, saying that the process was not “designed to 
awaken the impression of a higher degree of justice and humanity.”81 It is worth 
questioning Wurm’s tact in replying to the Archbishop, as much of Canterbury’s 
famous architecture, along with many lives, had been destroyed by German 
firebombs in 1942.82 
Following the fallout and controversy over the Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt, 
some EKD and other Protestant Church leaders convened to deal again with issues of 
guilt and produced the Darmstadt Declaration of 1947 and, subsequently, the Berlin-
Weisensee Statement of 1950. Darmstadt will be explored more in the next chapter. 
Although both sides would later argue that denazification had failed, they did 
so for different reasons. Most Germans rejected denazification, seeing it as being “an 
instrument of revenge”, whereas the Americans and a minority of Germans on the left 
actually saw the process as too soft.83 Some Americans satirically referred to 
denazification trials as “follower factories”, because in the end, on paper, they 
changed the status of Nazi criminals to mere followers only deserving mild 
punishment, for reasons that will be outlined in the next chapter.84 The biggest 
technical problem was that there were simply too many Germans to put on trial. In 
1945, there were over eight million registered party members in all of Germany, so 
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for all of these Germans to have appeared in front of a court within the three years 
that denazification was administered, roughly 7,306 party members would have had 
to be tried every day. At the height of denazification in September 1945, seven 
hundred trials were conducted per day in the American Zone. 
There were, of course, non-ideological Nazis who joined the party under pressure 
to keep their jobs, and would go on to work in government or the civil service after 
the war.85 These were called Muss Nazis, or “must Nazis”, and there is no doubt that 
there were some party members who had joined for such reasons, but this easily 
became a blanket excuse, used to avoid harsh sentencing. In his position as a senior 
clergyman, Theophil Wurm often argued that many members of the party were Muss 
Nazis. In a conference held on 2 July 1945 with members of Military Government, 
Wurm warned against the speed of denazification, saying 
 
[i]n removing public officials and industrialists from positions of responsibility, 
an attempt should be made to distinguish between those who were ‘forced’ into 
party membership and those who were members by conviction. I feel that many of 
these former ‘Nazis’ are indispensible, because they cannot be replaced. You are 
de-Nazifying too quickly, and putting people into positions who don’t know their 
job.86 
 
 
In response, Jacob Beam, a US Political Officer, informed Wurm that Military 
Government was aware of what he was saying, but that it did not have the luxury of 
working in a slow and calculating manner when dealing with former Nazis.87 Martin 
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Niemöller, in a memorandum written in November 1945, also criticised how “[t]he 
consequences of denazification are felt severely by so called ‘small people’ who went 
into the party, not by conviction, but to secure their jobs and business”.88 
Along with the term Muss Nazis, Germans often claimed that they were Mitläufer, 
or fellow travellers, Germans who were not members of the party so therefore were 
not charged as such, but were involved with Nazi actions to a significant extent, and 
therefore must be charged with the crimes of the Third Reich.89 Those labelled as 
Mitläufer were not considered to be high-class criminals, and could get away with 
simply paying fines.  
Before and after he attended the EKD meeting at Treysa, Barth toured 
Germany under American auspices writing reports and attending meetings of church 
leaders in almost every American occupied city. Barth found that Nazism was truly 
dead in Germany by the middle of 1945, as most Germans had turned away from it 
with the end of the war, and he presented his findings to the Military Government. 
The occupiers, who had no reason to know or care who Barth was and why his 
findings would carry extra legitimacy, essentially ignored him.90 Many of them could 
acknowledge his points, but disagreed as to their value. They were appalled at how 
quickly the Third Reich had been forgotten, how seemingly every German “had been 
opposed to it, had ‘always’ been opposed.”91 Pastor Wilhelm Ziegler, a church leader 
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from Baden, repeated Barth’s sentiments in late 1945, saying that the thirty per cent 
of Germans who had been members of the Nazi party in 1939 had shrunk to less than 
five per cent, and he feared that “[a]ll the people, who long since repudiated the Nazi 
spirit out of inner conviction, will be driven into complete confusion because of the 
purely bureaucratic and actually unjustly handled denazification, whereby the 
opposite of what the American occupation authorities intend will be attained.” Ziegler 
continued to muse that most Germans had welcomed the Americans as liberators, 
initially, but that they were growing to hate their occupiers.92 
For its part, the EKD claimed they did not wish to protect Germans who had 
contributed to or benefited from National Socialism, but were rather suspect of 
denazification as the process to determine guilt. Most Germans seemed to be unsure 
of what the purpose of denazification was, whether to prevent resurgence of Nazism 
or to punish the Germans, and in both cases the EKD saw itself as the proper 
institution for the task.93 
Even within the Military Government there was an awareness of the difficulty 
of denazification, as highlighted by Patton’s attitude. If it were simply a matter of 
having to “locate and intern dangerous Nazis, to repeal Nazi laws, to seize Nazi 
property and block Nazi bank accounts, and to disband Nazi affiliated organizations”, 
denazification would have been fairly simple, but in the American zone alone, Clay 
estimated that three hundred thousand government employees were needed to rebuild 
and administer civil organisations, so the goal was to make sure that anyone who had 
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been more than a nominal member of the party had to be denied access to becoming 
someone who could be of influence in Germany.94 In a report from Lucius Clay to 
General Eisenhower, Clay describes how the problems of denazification had confused 
a Military Government officer:  
 
His mission is to find capable public officials… at the same time, he must seek 
out and remove the Nazis. All too often, it seems that the only men with the 
qualifications… are the career civil servants… a great proportion of whom were 
more than nominal participants (by our definition) in the activities of the Nazi 
party.95 
 
 
Clay admitted that the Germans that had been in some way identified as 
having a connection to Nazism “could not be kept forever from political and 
economic life,” but he also acknowledged that “it was clearly essential to any hope of 
a democratic Germany that the real Nazis be identified so that they could be excluded 
from positions of leadership until new leaders emerged who would resist any effort 
on the part of former Nazis to exert influence again on German thinking.” Clay 
agreed with Barth and Ziegler that “Nazism, under that name, was dead through 
disastrous failure” but he feared the possibility of resurgence of far right reactionary 
ideology under a different name.96 
Soon after the war, while the Allies were holding him in Naples, Martin 
Niemöller gave a controversial interview with several reporters from the United 
States and Britain. In this interview he admitted that he had been hopeful about 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94  Clay, Decision in Germany, 67. 
 
95  Ibid. 
 
96  Ibid. 
	   89	  
National Socialism. He questioned democracy as a useful institution for the German 
people, arguing instead that Germany would do better under authoritarian rule, saying 
specifically “[i]t may be that Germany can become democratic, but you have got to 
face the fact that the German people are not adapted to the sort of democracy which 
exists in Britain and the United States. The German people are different... they like to 
be governed; they like to feel authority.”97 He insisted that Germans, himself 
included, had been “deceived” by Hitler, and that most Germans were not yet 
repentant. He defended his failed attempt at enlisting in the Navy in 1939, and wrote 
that he had only opposed Hitler religiously, not politically, while in prison. He asked 
for help from Britain and the United States, instead of punishment, and finished by 
saying: “The world will be astonished when it sees how many good people are left in 
Germany.”98 Lucius Clay, for his part, did his best to undermine Niemöller’s 
influence at this point, writing to Washington in September of 1945: “While 
permitting Niemöller to take active leadership in religious affairs, we have not felt it 
is advisable to utilise his services in other fields as yet. While his anti-Nazi stand was 
demonstrated fully by his own actions, it is still too early to predict as to his 
wholehearted rejection of the militaristic and nationalistic concepts of the former 
German state.”99 Others, such as the New York Times or Marshall Knappen, the 
Director of the Education & Religious Affairs for Military Government, sought to 
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distance Niemöller the pastor and religious figure from Niemöller the nationalistic 
former U-boat operator and political figure. 
This interview damaged Niemöller’s hard won international reputation, and 
allowed the Military Government to ignore his criticisms of denazification.100 The 
interview demonstrated that after the war he had stiffened his resolve to always 
preach what he perceived to be the truth, regardless of whether or not his opinions 
were popular. But in arguing that the Germans were ill suited for democracy and not 
repentant for the crimes of the Third Reich, he had explained to the newspaper 
reading Americans and Britons why some form of denazification was needed in 
Germany. Niemöller was still regarded as a hero, but the New York Times called him 
“a hero with limitations.”101 In late 1946, Martin Niemöller, in his capacity as the 
church leader in charge of organising ecumenical relations for the EKD, and his wife 
Else, became the first Germans allowed to visit the United States, and they toured the 
country for five weeks. The trip was an exercise in damage control, as he sought to 
move away from the controversial points he had made at Naples by focusing on the 
good work of the Confessing Church and declaring the guilt that he felt. He attempted 
to clarify the remarks from the interview by putting himself in a similar position to 
Bonhoeffer, stating that  
 
My wife informed me that my friends advised me to enlist. I though this would be 
a way to get out of prison and serve the cause which I loved, my Church and my 
God. I thought, if Hitler would win this war it would be the end of the Christian 
Church in Germany. Should Germany lose, Germany likewise would be a 	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destroyed as a nation. I thought that if I could get out of prison I could then lend 
my influence in the overthrow of Hitler and save my country perhaps through a 
negotiated peace.102 
 
 
For the most part he was welcomed in the United States as a figure who had 
displayed true Christian resistance to the evils of the Third Reich. However, a handful 
of people- mostly rabbis and politicians – continued to hold him accountable for the 
unpopular positions he had espoused in the Naples interview.103 
Martin Niemöller was not the only church leader giving high profile 
interviews to the foreign press. On 3 December 1945, Bishop Dibelius, in an 
interview given to the British Council of Churches from his private home in the 
American sector of Berlin criticised the United States denazification policy, saying 
that “they were just like the Russians and if they so acted there would be more 
National Socialists than when they arrived” and that “[t]hey had not understood how 
to win the German students for democracy.”104    
Although denazification and Law No. 8 were later seen as unfairly harsh towards 
the Germans, in the beginning the German masses responded positively to the 
process.105 Although Germans differed from Military Government on the opinions of 
a few cases, they showed, as Biddiscombe explains, quite 
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a considerable appetite for anti-Nazi purges. In late July 1945, 21st Army Group 
reported ‘a general and increasing outcry against the retention of Nazis in office’, 
even of so-called ‘nominals’, and reports from the American and French zones 
also indicated across-the-board support for denazification, with even elements of 
the [Christian Democratic Union] and the churches calling for a cleansing of 
German public life.106  
 
 
Many Germans admitted they did not know much about it; they supported it because 
they believed it would help to punish the worst offenders. As many as a third of all 
Germans admitted to not knowing any details about the denazification process, and 
the majority of American Zone Germans were more focused on the creation of a 
strong German economy.107 However, every single mayor polled in the fall of 1945 
(and most of the German people as well) endorsed the principles of denazification. 
Complaints were limited to inefficiencies caused by the dismissals and the 
undemocratic nature of the programme. This would suggest that in this first year the 
EKD was not only out of step with most Germans on the guilt question, but also in 
leading the attacks against denazification, rather than responding to the complaints of 
its parishioners. Richard Merritt, who analysed public opinion polling, wrote that 
 
Postwar Germans thus faced a dilemma. Those who had benefited personally 
from Nazism, most specifically the former Nazi party members, wanted as little 
denazification as possible. But what about the Germans who had suffered from 
Nazism’s consequences? On the one hand many were so disgusted with the 
behavior of the PGs in 1933-1945 that they wanted these moral lepers removed 
from positions of influence. On the other hand, however, many Germans, 
including some who applauded the principle of denazification, believed that 
rebuilding their war torn country was a demand of highest priority that required 	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assistance from its most qualified individuals. If this meant returning at least 
noncriminal PGs to influential positions, then so be it. In the circumstances, 
professional competence was more important than moral purity.108 
 
 
Late 1945 and early 1946 saw denazification at its zenith. By September of 1945 
the authorities in the American zone had removed 120,000 teachers, bureaucrats, 
police officers, and other civil servants and private workers, and were arresting a 
further seven hundred each day.109 The Nazi party and affiliated organisations had 
been completely dismantled, its laws had been nullified, and party members had been 
largely disenfranchised.110 Much had been accomplished; however, the complaints 
from the affected persons, whom the Protestant church leaders claimed to speak for, 
were growing. Although surveyed Germans were favourable towards a form of 
denazification, there was popular discontent with this version, mostly over how 
indiscriminately Military Government used party membership to determine guilt. At 
the end of November 1945, General Lucius Clay, responding to discontent, a 
declining American military presence, and his professional conclusion that the 
Germans should administer the programme, set up the Denazification Policy Board to 
“investigate the programme and recommend a permanent solution.”111 The Director 
of the Legal Division for Military Government, a man named Charles Fahy, was put 
in charge of this board. On 15 January 1946, Fahy submitted the board’s report, 
finding that denazification should have three objectives:  	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(1) the removal of political and economic authority from those who had 
dominated Nazi Germany as a means of assisting in changing the government 
element; (2) the rapid punishment of those responsible for Nazi wrongs and 
injustices, while (3) avoiding the future social instability arising from a large mass 
of permanent outcasts. 
 
 
The board further recommended that German public opinion must play a role in 
denazification, and that German participation in the process was “essential.”112 The 
findings and recommendations of this report are of extreme interest, as they show the 
awareness of the shortcomings of Military Government’s handling of denazification, 
and became the basis for the new policy regarding denazification. The report 
illustrates the serious effort put in to creating a better system, and therefore signifies 
that perhaps the problems were inherent in the idea of trying to remove Nazism from 
influence in German life rather than a fault of Military Government.113 
There was much debate surrounding the decision to make new policy. 
According to the historian Tom Bower, a secret report issued in January 1946 by the 
Public Safety Branch estimated that “less than one per cent of the German population 
were committed anti-Nazis.” An American who had negotiated the transfer of the 
administration of denazification to the Germans named David Robinson reported in 
the same month that “German political leaders admit that a ‘free’ election held in 
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Germany today would bring a modified Nazi government to power.”114 According to 
a Military Government survey only one in eleven Germans wanted to take the process 
out of American control, presumably because they did not want to have to administer 
this unpopular programme.115 Despite any reticence felt by Germans or the Military 
Government, the switch from United States to German administration, for better or 
for worse, was made, and a new form of denazification was to follow.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114  Bower, Blind Eye to Murder, 193. 
 
115  Merritt, Merritt, Public Opinion in Occupied Germany, 38. 
	   96	  
Chapter 3: In the hands of Germans: Denazification after the Law for Liberation  
March 1946 – May 1948 
 
“To use denazification as an instrument to establish democracy or to destroy an 
authoritarian social structure was equivalent to burning down a barn to get rid of the 
mice.”1 
-   Frederic Spotts, Churches and Politics in Germany 
    
“Nothing is less conducive to rehabilitation than harsh treatment, especially when 
one believes that treatment to be unjust.”2 
-   Alfons Heck, The Burden of Hitler’s legacy 
 
 
After much negotiation between Germans and Military Government, the switch to 
German administration began almost two months later on 5 March 1946 when, in the 
American Zone, denazification was (for the most part) transferred to German authority as 
the “Law for the Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism” passed through the 
Laenderrat, the newly elected Provincial Council.3 Military Government still “controlled, 
reviewed, and advised” through the Allied Control Council, but the process was now 
conducted through German administered tribunals, called Spruchkammern.4 As General 
Clay wrote in his memoirs, the law was enacted “to relieve [Military Government] from 
further direct responsibility in denazification proceedings, although we maintained our 
right to observe and supervise its execution.”5 According to the new law, now everyone 
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over eighteen who wanted to be eligible for food rations would have to fill out a new 
questionnaire, called the Meldebogen, and present it for examination at one of the 545 
established independent German investigation boards. These boards employed over 
twenty thousand people, and new regulations allowed for more discretion during the 
trials.6 If found guilty, the defendant would be removed from work (if they were in public 
service) and would be “liable to punishments of imprisonment, fines, and confiscation of 
property.” Those who had joined the party after 1937 were granted amnesty, as they were 
now presumed not to be “opportunists or committed followers.”7 
The new classifications and punishments of denazified Germans were as follows: 
 
 
[M]ajor offenders, to be punished by as much as ten years’ imprisonment, 
confiscation of property and permanent exclusion from public office; offenders 
subject to imprisonment, fine, and exclusion from public office but entitled to release 
from restriction on probation; [lesser offenders]; followers or nominal Nazis, who, 
although subject to fine, could henceforth exercise their rights of citizenship; and 
those exonerated as a result of investigation. Neither the German lawmakers nor 
Military Government wished to punish youth subjected to Nazi indoctrination in 
mass, but both desired their registration.8 	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Trials under the Law for Liberation began that summer, and, as before, sentences 
included, but were not limited to, fines, confinement, and a reduction in status to ordinary 
labour, both temporary and permanent.9 The law stated that the “American Military 
Government has now decided that the German people may share the responsibility for 
liberation from National Socialism and Militarism in all fields. The discharge of the task 
thus entrusted to the German people will be accomplished by this Law.”10 This was a 
version of denazification that “Military Government had to no small extent forced…upon 
the German officials responsible for drafting the law;” “Germans themselves had not 
readily accepted denazification as embodied in the Law for Liberation.”11 Special Branch 
appointed denazification ministers, who would continue to have oversight of the process, 
but now that Germans were in charge there was a hope that the focus would be switched 
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away from punishment, which could only work for the initial stages of the occupation, 
and more towards rehabilitating the former Nazis back into German society by labelling 
greater numbers as having simply been nominal members who were subsequently 
denazified. 
Military Government originally was very optimistic for this version of 
denazification.12 The first article promised to “secure a lasting base for German 
democratic national life” and that “[e]veryone who is responsible [for the crimes of 
National Socialism] shall be called to account.”13 However, the Law for Liberation 
produced predictably disappointing results - even local German opinion found that the 
first sentences made by the Spruchkammern were often lenient. Verdicts from the 
previous trials could now be overturned. Former Nazis and their sympathisers intimidated 
tribunals, and there was even black market of sorts where former Nazis could secure 
favourable verdicts.14 By the end of the year, Spruchkammern windows were smashed 
and interiors wrecked, and the homes and vehicles of the tribunal chairs were attacked 
and in other ways molested by former Nazi party members and their sympathisers.15 
In November, Military Government found that over eighty per cent of those they 
had classified as “major offenders” had been reclassified as “followers” or had been 
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exonerated. Fearing the programme had lost its effectiveness, General Lucius Clay gave a 
highly publicised speech to the Laenderrat in Stuttgart on 5 November 1946 (the one 
year anniversary of the creation of the local governments in Germany) where he told 
German authorities they had a probationary period of sixty days to improve the trials, or 
else he threatened to resume the Military Government’s denazification.16 Clay was 
furious; the Spruchkammern had re-labelled five hundred and seventy five “major 
offenders” he had personally investigated as “fellow travellers”, and forty-nine had been 
altogether acquitted.17 The hope that former Nazis would be properly punished under 
German administration had failed to be met, but at the end of the two months Clay could 
not fulfil his threat. As more soldiers returned to their homes in the United States, 
Military Government lacked the manpower to administer denazification again, but the 
Public Safety Branch did take control of finding appropriate work for Germans who had 
been cleared by these tribunals, as well as retaining the ability to demand further trials if 
they were not satisfied with German findings. Despite these setbacks some members of 
Military Government remained optimistic, with Clay’s denazification advisor Walter 
Dorn giving assurances that this was a “valuable exercise in democracy for the 
Germans,” and that things would change for the better “as soon as the work of the 
tribunals reaches its full momentum.”18 
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Tom Bower suggests that Dorn’s assurances were a bit premature, in that 
denazification “could never reach ‘full momentum’ because it collapsed.” In Bavaria, 
where they had expected around thirty thousand appeals under the new system, the 
Spruchkammer  
 
were overwhelmed with what finally amounted to no fewer than four hundred 
thousand appeals. With so little German political support, derided by the large 
number of Nazis who had a vested interest in destroying the programme and 
debilitated by the bleak conditions in post war Germany, it was sheer madness to 
expect to find ten thousand tribunal staff with the intellect, courage and stamina to 
investigate a minimum of one million five hundred thousand offenders – more so 
because the system was based on alien laws imposed by the victor.19 
 
 
The Angry Letter Offensive 
 
Even before the Law for Liberation passed many church leaders, both Protestant 
and Catholic, expressed their vehement disagreement with the policy. The Lutheran 
Bishops Theophil Wurm and Hans Meiser were the earliest opponents, vouching to 
authorities for the innocence of the men imprisoned as early as June 1945. Although 
Wurm had at one point demanded the “Germanification of denazification” from General 
Clay, after the Law of Liberation was passed he led the voice of German critics who had 
begun to compare the tactics of the Allies to those of the Nazis.20 His remarks often 
bordered on hysteria, he went as far as to say of the American prosecutors, that “their 
deeds do not lag behind those of the Nazis in sadism” and that denazification was 
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continuing the suffering the Germans had started.21 Wurm’s objection to denazification 
was personal as well as political, as his own son Dr. Hans Wurm had joined the Nazi 
party as a student in Munich in 1922 “solely because there was no other way to retain his 
hospital appointment.”22 During the first few months of denazification, this son was jailed 
for not acknowledging his party membership on his Frageboge.23 Wurm lobbied 
unsuccessfully to have his son pardoned, arguing that “Nazi Party membership was a 
poor indicator of responsibility for Nazi crimes” and that his son was in fact just as 
opposed to the Nazis as his father.24 Although many rank and file members of German 
society held strong opinions about denazification, both for and against, only one third of 
those surveyed “could describe the current program accurately.”25 
Most of the protests against denazification by the EKD following the Law for 
Liberation in 1946 came from angry letters and public statements. A few of them will be 
detailed to help to explain the EKD’s arguments, towards both denazification as it was 
practiced and the idea of collective guilt. For the most part these letters had little effect – 
at best, the EKD received replies that were meant to address its concerns without 
promising any changes, and at worst its letters were simply ignored. As the head of the 
EKD, Wurm signed off on the letters, although it is unclear if he actually wrote all of 	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them. To simplify Wurm’s core argument, the historian Robert Ericksen wrote that “[h]e 
advocated a very narrow process directed against a tiny group of ‘real criminals,’ and 
protested that any other policy criminalised political views and behaviours after the 
fact.”26 
The first example of an anti denazification letter bearing Wurm’s name comes 
from 26 April 1946. In an open letter written to Military Government and the local 
governments he appealed directly to Military Government in an effort to lay out his 
argument, explaining why he believed the law was arbitrary and capricious, and that “in 
all respects, the law is not in accordance with the natural sense of justice [because] it pays 
no attention to the elementary rule of law, which designate the laws of civilised nations, 
and does not deny their past ties to the commandment of God.”27 He argued that the new 
law was breaking established legal norms by charging people for associating with a 
“legally constituted and internationally recognised regime.”28 He pointed out the 
overwhelming resources the United States had at its disposal, in contrast with the 
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unprepared German defence that had not been able to adequately review American 
evidence, stating that there was a “handicap of the defence against the Prosecution.” He 
complained about coerced witnesses, poor facilities for the tribunals, and the difficulties 
of finding evidence for defendants. It should be noted that this letter was written before 
the Law for Liberation had been fully implemented.29 
The letter, however, was not just a list of complaints. There is an unsubtle 
exertion of resistance early in the letter:  
 
The Christian Church must draw attention to the fact that the law is not suitable 
because its intent is to control the conscience of the German people. The Church is 
itself a product of the German conscience, and, in the service of divine justice and 
truth, will not preach to the German people this law and its implementation in all its 
parts.30 
  
 
He further stated “[w]e can not remain silent when new debts and new 
injustices will be brought by the Law for Liberation from National Socialism and 
Militarism. Our concerns are directed against the basic conception of the whole 
legislation.” It is contrary to a “natural sense of justice” and “elementary principles of 
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law” because it retroactively punishes “actions and attitudes” that had been “judged 
by the former administrations as lawful and good.”31  
General Clay, responded to Wurm in a letter written on 25 May 1946, thanked the 
Bishop for his letter but then added “[a]fter careful consideration of your letter of 
26 April, the military government has decided that a change of the Law for 
Liberation is neither necessary nor desirable.” Through the course of his response, he 
step by step refuted Wurm’s arguments, arguing that “[i]t is obvious that you have to 
allow the German people to take action through which [Nazi] influence is eliminated 
from the German life, which was so disastrous both for the Germans themselves as 
well as for countless others”. He refuted Wurm’s claim that everyone who had any 
remote relationship with Nazism would be ruined, writing that if “a lack of inner 
affiliation or rejection of Nazism is apparent” the defendant will be so identified. He 
also reminded Wurm that it was now Germans who were in control of almost all 
aspects of the process, such as formation of the Spruchkammern and, depending on 
the severity of the crimes, the penalties. He then wrote that there was a review 
process, and that those who were found guilty who could show mitigating 
circumstances and good behaviour might be reclassified. Clay rejected Wurm’s 
criticisms about the way the process would be handled under German control, calling 
them “assumptions”, “educated guesses”, that were not backed up by “probative” 
evidence, and therefore could only be refuted by further speculation. He wrote that 
the law is clear, and that therefore he did not foresee abuse: “Probation provisions 
are for more serious cases” and “[only] the seriously guilty (Class I and II) will have 	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strict procedures, and indeed this will be in accordance with the seriousness of their 
behavior.”32  
This step-by-step explanation was the best response that the EKD would receive – 
Clay ignored subsequent letters and public statements from members of the EKD.33 This 
new attitude showed a marked departure from the pair’s earlier relations, as Clay had 
asked Wurm to enter politics and lead the provisional local government in Württemberg, 
which the bishop had turned down to focus on rebuilding his church.34 Wurm was not the 
only church leader criticising Clay following this new policy. Bishop Aloisius Muench, 
an American bishop from Fargo, North Dakota who was serving as liaison between 
United States Government and the Vatican concerning the Catholics in Germany and 
Austria, delivered a scathing report to Clay from the Catholic Church in July 1947. 
Muench lacked diplomatic finesse, and in his report he decried the failures of 
denazification, particularly the Law for Liberation, stating it had “caused the Germans to 
lose confidence in the concept of justice of the Americans,” and asked for amnesty for all 
former Nazis who had never held leadership positions.35 Walter Dorn wrote a vehement 
reply for Clay to sign, which called the bishop’s requests “not always easily intelligible”, 
and argued down each of the bishop’s points.36 No matter how eloquent Clay was in 
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explaining his reasoning, however, he was never able to appease his increasingly vocal 
critics. In his memoirs, Clay acknowledged that the law had been a controversial one, but 
he argued that is was the only possible solution. He argued that Germans were far better 
at judging other Germans than a foreign military board would be, and that the Germans 
who administered denazification did so voluntarily.37 
After Wurm had written to Clay but before he had received his reply, the EKD 
began to organise a campaign against denazification. On 2 May 1946, the church leaders 
issued the “Treysa Statement by the Council of the Evangelical Church in Germany to 
Carry out the Denazification of the German Folk”, the “Statement of the EKD Council on 
the Application of Denazification Provisions from the Pulpit,” and a set of guidelines for 
how the Church should purify itself, recognising that it had been corrupted by Nazism 
and needed its own internal denazification process.38 The Treysa Statement began with an 
acceptance of the need for some sort of denazification policy, and an acceptance that 
anyone who had committed a crime in connection with the Nazis must be punished. It 
argued that because it admitted this, and because it had admitted guilt at Stuttgart (it 
failed to reiterate that guilt here), that they are in a position where they have “the right 
and freedom to express their serious concerns about the procedure followed today”. The 
statement calls it a Grundsatz der Gerechtigkeit (Principle of Justice) that people should 
not be judged on party membership alone, and that no tribunal should use membership 
alone to presume the ethos of an accused German.  	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In the statement, the EKD invokes the Roman legal principle of nulla poena sine 
lege, the idea that somebody cannot be punished for something that is not against the law, 
and therefore these denazification laws go against “the natural sense of right.”39 This 
became a reoccurring criticism against denazification, but it seems to contradict the 
EKD’s stated position that those who have committed crimes in connection with National 
Socialism should be punished. Although the Church agreed that former Nazis must be 
punished, they did not want to see the German economy fall apart, which they argue was 
happening. The EKD claimed that things had become so bad that even the Church could 
not get people to experience redemption. The EKD argued that it could not bring people 
to spiritual growth when they were continually being penalised for crimes of an old 
government. Specifically, the EKD was arguing for young people who had belonged to 
Nazi affiliated organisations, and were now barred from becoming students under 
denazification. The statement rejected the questionnaires, stating that the wording treated 
one as already incriminated, and that this could not lead to a "moral recovery".40 The 
EKD’s statement further warned that, for these reasons, denazification was turning 
Germans into nihilists; it argued that Germans had been forced to reject National 
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Socialism but had nothing to turn to, as they were not able to see the benefits of 
democracy.41 
This moral recovery was the core of the EKD’s argument, and they wrote 
 
The Church does not defend the Nazi mind when it recites these concerns. But you 
know that the decline in confidence in the human legal system can be a hindrance to 
hear the proclamation of the divine law and divine grace. It is our conviction that our 
people can only come to a clean slate when they are able to hear the message of 
God’s Word.42 
 
 
The statement ends by stressing that the redemption of the German people after 
years of National Socialism will come not from the policy of denazification practiced by 
the Military Government, but from the Church.  
The second statement of 2 May was much shorter and less profound. The focus 
was on how the Church should self-denazify, and took aim at the German Christians.  
It is worth noting that these public declarations would not have been permitted 
under the Third Reich – these writings were not private correspondence, but rather public 
repudiations of the policy of the victorious Allies. This freedom of dissent came from 
Clay, who was a strong supporter of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), and 
allowed director Arthur Garfield Hays unrestricted access to the country. Clay later told 	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his biographer that he did not “believe in the use of the power of government to stifle 
people in expressing themselves freely”, although he added that “a civilised society must 
have a certain discipline. And that discipline must consist of a respect for law and 
order.”43  
There was one final important development in the relationship between the 
Protestant Church and Military Government that occurred in May of 1946; the Lutheran 
Land Bishops of Bavaria, Württemberg-Baden, and Hesse, as well as the Catholic 
Church, signed an agreement on how the churches were to self-denazify under the Law 
for Liberation.44 The agreement was straightforward – if a clergyman was a suspected 
Nazi, he would be reported to the appropriate Land bishop, who would investigate and, if 
he were not simply dismissed, the clergyman would be tried. The trial would be assessed 
by at least one other member of the clergy, one who was on record as being anti-Nazi. On 
12 August that same year, Lucius Clay told Walter Dorn  
 
[w]e had been extraordinarily lenient with the church … although we had given the 
church every consideration in permitting its leaders to clean their own households, 
many clergymen who are considered by our Special Branch to be Mandatory 
Removals are still continuing in office.45 
 
 
There was a debate, not just among church leaders but also responsible leaders of 
Military Government, over whether or not denazification was working. In May of 1946, 
the Chief Historian for Military Government Donald B. Robinson wrote in an article for 	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The American Mercury that eight hundred thousand former party members still held 
bureaucratic and industrial posts in the American Zone.46 These men worked with 
Military Government approval, and the response from one captain was merely to shrug it 
off and reply “the war’s over.”47  
Later in the year, when it was apparent that Military Government was not 
interested in the complaints about denazification made by the EKD, an appeal was made 
instead to the Church of England, hoping it could become an ally in the struggle against 
denazification. This appeal took the form of a letter written on behalf of the EKD by 
Martin Niemöller on 27 November 1946 to the Rt. Rev. George Bell, the Bishop of 
Chichester.48 Bell had publicly supported Niemöller in the British press when the latter 
had been put in a concentration camp, arguing that Niemöller was a religious figure and 
not a political one, thereby raising questions as to why Hitler and the Nazis had 
imprisoned him.49 During the war, the Bishop had preached against the bombing of 
German cities, and had supported the creation of the EKD when the war was over. In his 
letter Niemöller stated that, according to the rate of denazification for 1946, Bavaria was 
still eight years away from denazification, and Hamburg was twelve. He repeated many 
of the common criticisms – denazification was too slow, too harsh on the lesser offenders 
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– and asked for the Bishop to petition for an amnesty to be given to class III and IV 
offenders, the Minderbelastete and Mitlaufer. The British and the American Zones had 
recently combined to form Bizonia, and Niemöller was hoping that the British, with their 
different view of denazification, might be convinced to put pressure on the American 
Military Government. Although the letter was a message from one church leader to 
another, Niemöller addressed Bell more in his capacity as a politician, not focusing on his 
problems of denazification through a moral or religious lens but rather using a more 
bureaucratic argument. He did, however, state that  
 
the whole moral and spiritual attitude over here is becoming more and more strained, 
mostly due to the bad material and food situation; but there is no doubt that the 
weight of moral strain and hopelessness, of which the denazification – difficulties 
form an important part, presses heavily upon our population, causing frictions and all 
sorts of dissatisfaction, and hampering every chance of new spiritual life and 
revival.50 
 
 
It is clear from the letter that the EKD had realised that Military Government was 
not paying attention to its letters, and so the EKD was instead looking to foreign churches 
for support. The EKD was, however, to be disappointed. In response to the letter Bell’s 
staff wrote a denazification report for the Bishop, and in its first draft they came to the 
conclusion that “Dr. Niemöller has given a rather inaccurate picture of how the 
denazification programme generally will work out.” The draft predicted, accurately, that 
far from the eight years in Bavaria (and twelve in Hamburg) that Niemöller believed 
remained, the whole process would be finished by mid to late 1948.51 
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It should be noted that, again, the EKD was leading anti-denazification sentiment. 
A review of public opinion surveys in the American Zone soon after the Law for 
Liberation had been passed suggests that in mid-March 1946 two thirds of Germans held 
positive views towards this new law.52 Again, most Germans had more pressing concerns 
than following denazification policy, and there is a correlation between those who were 
more informed and those who were less satisfied, but the polling suggests that the EKD 
was against denazification by conviction, not because there was pressure from the 
parishioners. The surveys do not suggest that the EKD was changing attitudes, rather, it 
seems that public opinion was soured by the inconsistencies among the Spruchkammern; 
evidence of corruption; a belief that Germany was spending too much of its depleted 
economic resources on the process when they could be better allocated; and a divide 
between those who thought the programme was either too harsh or too lenient.53 
Although members of the EKD continued to write letters of protest, this tactic was 
not producing any tangible results, and it was clear that a more direct form of action was 
required if it wanted to successfully undermine denazification policy.  
In August of 1946, the controversial self-denazification of the EKD came to an 
end, when it “sent a delegation to Military Government to plead” that the remaining 
clergy members who had been corrupted by Nazism be allowed exemption from 
denazification. According to Dorn, the argument was that the denazification policy had 
become “an unwarranted interference in the affairs of the church. This was an argument 
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which Military Government could not accept.”54 Military Government had always been 
careful to respect the laws of the EKD and the belief of the divine character of its leaders, 
but it believed that the Church’s status as a leader in German society meant that 
clergymen should therefore not be judged differently than laity, and certainly not 
accorded preferentially easier treatment. On 22 August 1946, General Clay stated that the 
EKD had until 20 October 1946 to remove all such clergymen from its ranks. This was 
achieved successfully thanks to the local German Minister-Presidents and the leadership 
of Bishop Dibelius, who was able to make it not just an issue of “purging the church of 
unsuitable clergymen” but of “inspired leadership which aimed at a genuine religious 
renewal.”55  
The Church was not the only group within Germany that the United States wanted 
to call upon to support their occupation efforts, and as political organisations reappeared 
they were courted as well. Wilhelm Hoegner was the Minister President of Bavaria, and 
as such he was the German responsible for denazifying the region. He was given this 
position because he was one of few politicians willing to endorse the Law for Liberation 
– the United States wanted to make sure the political parties would fall in line, even if it 
meant manipulating party leadership. When Hoegner issued a proclamation in which he 
endorsed the law, along with the other major political parties in Germany on 22 June 
1946, Military Government backed his statement with much publicity.56 This statement 
gave the assurance that “those who did not actively participate in the Nazi regime have 
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nothing to fear from this law,” and ends by stating that “[w]e therefore call upon all 
citizens, irrespective of party or creed, to stand behind this law so that Bavaria may look 
with hope and confidence to the future.”57 
It would be wrong to assume that Hoegner’s statement reflected a new direction 
in attitudes towards denazification from all political factions. Hoegner had suppressed 
Bavaria’s largest party, the Christian Social Union, and the CSU continued to stand 
against the law. The CSU leader, Dr. Joseph Mueller, had signed the law, but that was 
after Military Government had threatened his leadership position in the CSU.58 Because 
parties such as the CSU would not give a free endorsement of denazification, 
proclamations such as Hoegner’s were of little value. 
   Amendments and Changes 
 
Whether one agreed with the church leaders or Military Government, the same 
major problem with the process continued under the new German administration: 
denazification was not moving fast enough. One of the first acts of the new tribunals was 
to expedite the process. The biggest complaint against denazification was that it targeted 
too many people. Most of these people had been victims of automatic arrest and then had 
to wait in internment camps until they were brought in front of a Spruchkammer. Prior to 
the Law for Liberation the process was generally widened to bring in more Nazis and 
followers by amendments to the JCS 1067 but with the passage of the Law for Liberation 	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amendments no longer widened the scope, but narrowed it.59 One of the solutions that 
Clay helped work out was to grant clemency to all defendants born between 1 January 
1919 and 5 March 1928, unless they were classified as Class I or Class II offenders.60 
This so called “Youth Amnesty” was introduced on 8 July 1946, and was extended to 
about 2,000,000 men and women.61 Karl Barth, amongst other church leaders, had 
pushed in vain for the Youth Amnesty to cover all of those born after 1913, regardless of 
whether or not they had high-ranking posts in the Hitler Youth or the SA, as that entire 
generation had been swept up with National Socialism and it should be a priority to win 
them over to democracy.62 Even with the Law for Liberation and this Youth Amnesty, the 
process remained slow in light of the scope of the problem, and many Germans felt 
sympathy for former party members. In an effort to further accelerate the programme, 
that winter, one of the coldest in German history, another blanket amnesty, called the 
“Christmas Amnesty” of 1946, was granted to over a million incriminated Germans who 
were either over fifty per cent disabled or economically disadvantaged.63 Nearly seventy 
per cent of the pending cases were resolved with these amnesties, and it was clear from 
now on that denazification was going to keep growing narrower.64 
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Although these amnesties helped to reduce the numbers, by the beginning of 1947 
the United States still held over ninety thousand Germans awaiting trial in its detention 
centres. Almost two million more had been barred from professional work by 
Spruchkammer judgments, only allowed to find jobs in manual labour.65 
Another important development that occurred around this time that changed the 
way the Allied Occupation was administered was that the United States made an offer to 
its wartime Allies to pool resources by uniting zones. As already mentioned, the British 
immediately accepted this offer and by 9 August 1946 Bizonia was created. The guiding 
idea was that it “would have a common standard of living, pooled resources and a 
common export policy, and would fix imports necessary to supplement indigenous 
resources.”66 In Bizonia, new newspapers and radio shows were created as the only forms 
of media in an attempt to re-educate Germany.67 However, despite these mergers, 
denazification carried on as before. Until March 1948 the French opted out of joining the 
United American and British Zones, arguing that France “didn’t like the idea of 
resurrecting the ‘Reich’”, but when France did join the name changed to Trizonia, the 
territory of which would later form much of the Federal Republic of Germany.68 
      The Question of Democracy 
 
The year 1947 proved to be relatively quieter in terms of the EKD’s campaign 
against denazification. Its position on the process did not fundamentally change, but as an 	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organisation it failed to unify in any meaningful way to argue against it. At a meeting 
held in Treysa that January, Hans Asmussen told other church leaders that “[w]e cannot 
deny that the American and German authorities are committing a grave injustice with 
denazification” and asked  “have our people the belief, in the deepest sense, that their 
interests are being betrayed?” He blamed this “crisis of confidence” on denazification.69 
Bishop Johannes Lilje and Hans Meiser, both signatories of the Stuttgart Declaration, 
now seemed to be stepping away from that document. This deepened an already existing 
rift between them and other signatories, such as Pastors Niesel and Niemöller, who not 
only believed in the statement but also understood that the other side’s rhetoric would 
undermine the relationship the EKD had with the occupying powers. The substance of the 
arguments against denazification this year was that it would poison the Germans against 
democracy, which was not a new argument of the EKD’s, or, as I will explain, a 
particularly truthful one. However, what these repeated responses from leading 
churchmen towards denazification portrayed, whether they were exaggerated or not, was 
a feeling of helplessness from the EKD. Whereas it had previously presented reasoned 
arguments, after the passage of the Law for Liberation its criticisms grew increasingly 
hyperbolic.   
At the Church of St. Mark in Stuttgart on Good Friday 1947, Pastor Helmut 
Thielicke delivered a sermon titled “The Passion without Grace” that was a harsh and 
poignant rejection of denazification.70 Thielicke had been an ardent opponent of the Third 
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Reich, having been dismissed from academic life for refusing to declare party loyalty, 
and because of that the Allies allowed him to tour the internment camps after the war, 
where, in his words, “several thousand both genuine and merely putative Nazis were 
imprisoned.”71 After witnessing the poor conditions in which they were kept, and having 
always believed that denazification was a bad policy for morally rehabilitating the Nazis, 
he had decided that he needed to publicly and powerfully denounce the policy. 
In his sermon, he stated 
 
[w]hat has happened among us in the name of denazification is not only unjust, it is 
the murder of the soul and of faith. It has not only led to families standing 
despairingly before an earthly void, but has also caused the void of eternity to gape 
open before human beings, because it threatens to shatter their faith that a heavenly 
Father could have anything to do with this insane pandemonium.72 
 
 
The effect of Thielicke’s sermon was indeed powerful. Outside of the church, a 
sobbing and adoring crowd surrounded him.73 Upon his return home, a United States 
army officer demanded a translated copy of his sermon, which was then delivered to 
Clay, who decided not to respond in any way Thielicke. A few months later, however, his 
trip to the United States was cancelled, and a Military Government staffer told Thielicke 
in confidence that it had been cancelled in response to this sermon. The sermon was soon 
copied and spread throughout Germany, and found its way into denazification internment 
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camps. It was even reprinted in newspapers in both the United States and Britain.74 
Although he represented the majority opinion held by the EKD, not everyone in the 
Protestant Church endorsed his sermon. Hermann Diem, who was a friend of Thielicke’s 
despite the fact that the two had vastly different views on the guilt thesis, wrote a letter 
about the ideas of guilt expressed in the sermon that began a correspondence with 
Thielicke.75 
In his response to Thielicke’s sermon, Diem admitted that he had expressed 
similar ideas to the Americans, but he stressed that it was different because he had gone 
straight to a commanding officer, and told him personally that the American behaviour 
was “the biggest obstacle that we pastors have to overcome.”76 He went on to dismiss 
Thielicke’s complaints, stating they were more situational than theological, and stated his 
regret of Thielicke’s actions. He asked that Thielicke include Diem’s review in the 
publication of his sermon.77 Thielicke agreed to publish this dissent, and over the next 
several letters the two engaged in a theological discussion about guilt, citing Barth, 
Kierkegaard, Descartes, amongst others, in an attempt to work out the appropriate way to 
understand the issue. Ultimately all of this correspondence, as well as a sermon on guilt 
delivered by Diem, was published in the widely circulated booklet die Schuld der 
Anderen (The Guilt of Others). Diem was not the only church leader Thielicke found 
himself in disagreement with at this time. Although he attempted to remain on friendly 	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terms with both of them, Thielicke wrote extensively of his theological disagreements 
concerning guilt and denazification with Barth and Niemöller, both of whom had also 
disapproved of the rhetoric used in the Good Friday sermon.78   
Thielicke’s attitude towards the internment camps, although partly based on visits 
he made, was likely to have been informed by Wurm. In February of 1947, while making 
the case that the Allied policies had become a unifying point of distress amongst 
Germans that could spark a sort of “renazification”, Wurm submitted to Military 
Government a memorandum on conditions in internment camps. The memorandum 
included a list of complaints, which were as follows: 
 
In the internment camps all around Ludwigsburg alone there are hundreds of 
internees, cases of automatic arrest, who despite all promises are not released yet. 
In many instances internees now, after 15 to 20 months, have not yet been questioned, 
some do not even know why they have been deprived of their liberty. 
Those who have passed the tribunals without having been condemned to the work 
camps are still not set free because the Americans have not yet confirmed the 
judgment.  
Alone in Camp No. 74, approximately 500 internees are ‘frozen’ because they figure 
on an IMT-list (International Military Tribunal List), Nevertheless, no reproach 
whatever seems to have been levelled against them; they have been detained for now 
more than one and a half years only because perhaps in the course of some criminal 
proceedings they may be wanted as witnesses or informants. In the same camp some 
55 detainees, also without intelligible reason, await liberation. 
The promised freeing of the dying eight weeks before their prospective demise has to 
pass so many instances that in the meantime the sick often die.  
In Camp No. 74 there are still three double amputees, one blind amputee and 
countless severely maimed. 
Numerous women have minor [i.e. young] children waiting at home from whom they 
have been separated for almost two years. In most of these cases, crimes that would 
require condemnation to work camps have not been committed, 
Decent, innocent persons are detained together with criminals (homosexuals, 
prostitutes, etc.)79 	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Soon thereafter, in an interview with The New York Times on the second 
anniversary of V-E day, Wurm gave his harshest denunciation of Military Government 
yet, no longer limiting it to denazification. While Clay was touting his accomplishments 
in creating Bizonia and rebuilding bombed cities, Wurm was angrily stating that  
 
two years ago…we Germans believed we had surrendered to a savior. Now we 
wonder that after 130 years of political experience Americans have not developed any 
farther than to demand total punishment of a nation. If present conditions continue, 
we will soon face moral capitulation, with much graver results than political 
capitulation.80  
 
Another such public statement came from a sermon delivered by Wurm in late 1947, 
detailed in an article by the historian Clemens Vollnhals, where he stated that "[p]eople 
who have been quiet as a mouse during the twelve years [of National Socialism], can now 
pose as anti-fascists and utilise their hatred of decent fellow citizens.81  
It was clear that Wurm had lost all confidence in the occupiers, and the idea that 
the path to German redemption would be achieved through democracy. The Stuttgart 
Declaration was the official position of the EKD, and it confirmed a “Solidarity of Guilt” 
amongst Protestant clergymen, from both the Confessing Church and the German 
Christians. Some Protestant leaders, from within and outside of the EKD such as 
Niemöller, Niesel and Barth believed in collective guilt and were against denazification, 
and argued that their stance was not inconsistent because if collective guilt equated to 
legal guilt then every German would have to be removed from office, effectively 
crippling Germany. Martin Niemöller, who had argued that all Germans were guilty for 	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the crimes of the Third Reich, was amongst the most vocal of opponents of 
denazification. He argued that the process had embittered the churches against Military 
Government and made it difficult for Germans to see the benefits of Democracy over 
Nazism. He also argued that it had caused the Germans to blur the difference between 
moral and criminal guilt.82 His argument, as Frederic Spotts explained it, was that “[i]f 
the people could really see democracy at work, the church would more easily accomplish 
its task of moral and spiritual rehabilitation.”83  
These claims of Germans not being able to see the benefits of Democracy over 
Nazism seem to be exaggerated. In Lucius Clay’s memoirs, Clay details the first two free 
elections in Germany since 1933, local elections in Wuerttemberg-Baden on 20 January 
1946, and then in Hesse and Bavaria a week later. On the local level, at least, the 
Germans seemed to be responding positively to democracy. According to Clay,  
 
[i]n every town and village long lines were waiting at the polling places in schools, 
town halls, and sometimes in the remains of bomb-damaged buildings, when they 
opened. Old and young, men and women, the well and the sick had turned out in cold 
winter weather to record their votes. Free elections had returned to Germany, and the 
German people had responded.84  
 
 
Of course, Clay had chosen to keep Nazi Party members disenfranchised, but this was a 
substantive step towards rebuilding German democracy. It seems that Niemöller’s claim 
had just been part of the venomous rhetoric that surrounded denazification; it should be 
remembered that Niemöller had argued against democracy for Germany in his infamous 
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1945 Naples interview. Exaggerated or not, however, it was a common criticism, and it 
seems that what Barth had described in 1945 as an opportunity for the Allies to bring in 
democracy by acting like gentlemen was now dismissed as having failed by churchmen 
such as Wurm, Niemöller, Thielicke, and Diem.85 
It might come as a surprise that Martin Niemöller, while arguing for collective 
guilt, was amongst the most vocal of opponents of denazification and occupation 
policy.86 This stance against denazification seems contradictory, since he spoke out 
against German refusal to accept guilt: this was evidenced by their focus on their 
suffering brought on by the Allies and their ignorance of the suffering they brought to the 
Poles, Jews, French, Russians, and other peoples.87 However, his views were not 
inconsistent, as he and other theologians believed that the Church was responsible for the 
spiritual and moral rehabilitation of Germany, and that denazification was getting in the 
Church’s way. Niemöller went as far as to argue that any form of denazification was 
unnecessary. Fourteen months after his release, he believed that he had yet to find any 
Germans who had not recognised the madness of the Hitler era: that “‘[d]enazification’ is 
still seen as the key to the whole problem… is a fundamental error, for any recrudescence 
of Nazism is quite out of the question.”88  
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At the Moscow Conference of March 1947, a conference that had been called for 
at the Potsdam Conference, both East and West blamed each other for the failures of 
denazification.89 The American Secretary of State George Marshall stated a desire for “a 
Control Council law based on CC Directive no. 38, which would potentially apply a 
uniform version of denazification throughout Germany”, whereas “Molotov pushed for 
measures in order to speed up the pace of the programme.”90 Molotov was able to 
favourably compare the United States’ failure in denazification to Soviet successes.91 It 
was clear that changes were needed, and ultimately it was agreed that denazification 
would be scaled down.92 Of course, denazification was one of many subjects that were 
discussed at this meeting as United States policy was gearing up for the Cold War, and 
therefore denazification became less important.  
Soon thereafter, on 11 July 1947, the law that governed Germany, JCS 1067, was 
replaced by JCS 1779, which called “for German self-sufficiency, new industrial targets, 
and a revision of the reparations list.”93 This was a law that demanded much less out of 
the Germans; JCS 1067 had “included six paragraphs devoted to denazification” whereas 
“JCS 1779 included only one sentence, which ordered implementation of the decision 
taken by the foreign ministers at Moscow.” This new policy was seen as “a derivative of 
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the Marshall plan,” which was introduced in a speech by George Marshall around this 
same time.94  
In 1947, while on a lecture tour of western parts of Germany, Karl Barth called for 
members of the Protestant leaders who were not satisfied with the Stuttgart Declaration 
of Guilt to meet in Darmstadt in an attempt to create another, more powerful statement.95 
There was a political nature to the Darmstädter Wort, or the Darmstadt Declaration, 
officially titled the “Statement by the Council of Brethren of the Evangelical Church of 
Germany Concerning the Political Course of our people,” that came out of this meeting. 
The statement tried to move the EKD away from the strong nationalist and anti-
communist political position that it was then occupying. This made the statement out of 
step with the majority of conservative Christian leaders in Germany, and this deviation 
from what was becoming the Church norm diluted its influence.96 The final document, 
published 8 August 1947, was highly controversial because of its deviations from 
Lutheran doctrine, specifically its call for the Church to engage in “progressive political 
engagement.” It opened by reaffirming ecclesiastical guilt, using the term unserer 
gesamten Schuld, or “totally of our guilt”, carefully avoiding the controversial term 
Kollektivschuld, or collective guilt. More specifically, the declaration stated:  
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The word of the world’s reconciliation with God in Christ has been proclaimed to us.  
We are to hear, accept, respond to, and follow this word. We do not hear, accept, 
respond to, and follow this word, if we do not allow ourselves to be absolved totally 
of our guilt, from the guilt of our fathers just as from our own. This is also true if we 
do not allow ourselves to be summoned by Jesus Christ, the Good Shepherd, to turn 
away from all the false and evil paths, which we as Germans have wrongly followed 
in our political predilections and actions.97 
 
 
As with the Stuttgart declaration, there was no mention of the Jews in the Darmstadt 
Declaration.98  Karl Barth, Hermann Diem, and many of the other alumni of the Barmen 
Declaration of 1934 attended meetings for the drafting of this new declaration, and they 
argued that this statement was a logical progression from the ideas they had included in 
that declaration.99 Darmstadt was for the members of the Church who found the wording 
of the Stuttgart declaration to be too vague, and who wanted to reiterate those ideas in a 
more detailed manner. The signatories of the Darmstadt Declaration targeted EKD 
leaders who believed that expressing guilt at Stuttgart was enough on the subject and 
were now more focused on the harsh Allied treatment; the Darmstadt signatories believed 
that the EKD should instead be continuing to assess Church guilt.100 Although he had 
written the statement in conjunction with Martin Niemöller and H.J. Iwand, Barth was 	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sollen wir hören, annehmen, tun und ausrichten. Dies Wort wird nicht gehört, nicht 
angenommen, nicht getan und nicht ausgerichtet, wenn wir uns nicht freisprechen lassen 
von unserer gesamten Schuld, von der Schuld der Väter wie von unserer eignen, und 
wenn wir uns nicht durch Jesus Christus, den guten Hirten, heim rufen lassen auch von 
allen falschen und bösen Wegen, auf welchen wir als Deutsche in unserem politischen 
Wollen und Handeln in die Irre gegangen sind. 
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not listed as one of the principle authors, as his Swiss Reformed theology continued to 
alienate many of the German Lutherans.101 
The Darmstadt Declaration was popular internationally, but internally the 
conservative wing of the EKD criticised it for having Marxist undertones and for 
continuing to remind the Germans of their guilt while they were trying to combat 
denazification. That does not mean that the Darmstadt group supported denazification, 
but that rather they believed that by constantly focusing on denazification the EKD was 
distracting Germans from theological self assessment and the need for a personal 
confession of guilt. This difference of opinion led the Theophil Wurm and Hans 
Asmussen faction of the EKD to reject the Darmstadt Declaration. This split in the EKD 
partly explains why the Darmstadt Declaration did not have the same impact as the 
Stuttgart Declaration; however, it was the Darmstadt Declaration that effectively secured 
the memory of the Stuttgart Declaration as a recognition of guilt, “by hardening the 
debate: either one accepted the meaning of an acknowledgment as sanctioned by the 
Darmstadt Message, or one opposed the Stuttgart Declaration; it was no longer possible 
or necessary to debate its meaning.”102 
Until October 1947, German Spruchkammern were trying an average of fifty 
thousand Germans per month. Priority had been given to those classified as “followers” 
so that they might be able to find employment while evidence was still being gathered to 
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try the interned Class I and Class II offenders. Therefore, there was an entire 
classification of prisoners, who by October 1947 had not been tried. In order to expedite 
the process so that the more virulent offenders might be tried Military Government 
introduced the Amendment of October 1947 to the Law for Liberation. The 
Amendment’s purpose was to give the tribunals more flexibility in determining their 
classifications by allowing those who had joined the party before May of 1937 to be 
reclassified from “Offender” to “Follower”, and the hope was that this would hasten the 
denazification process. The presumption of guilt was also removed, so trials could only 
go ahead if there was evidence.103 Although this was only supposed to downgrade those 
who presented evidence of never having been a “Major Offender”, the usual community 
pressure and heavy workload assured that most of those classified as an “Offender” 
would now be reclassified as a “Follower”. 104 Within a few months, the number of 
“Major Offenders” and “Offenders” had dropped from 727,000 to 230,000.105 
Writing of the proposed amendment on 31 August 1947 in a top-secret letter to the 
American Secretary of War Kenneth C. Royall and Undersecretary William Henry 
Draper Jr., Clay stated his hesitance to “hurry in connection with modification of the 
denazification program. It should not follow too quickly the announcement of the 
increased level of industry as it would appear we were going all out to be soft to 
Germany.” He showed confidence that this would be a good amendment, by continuing 
to write that “[w]e now have under discussion with our German officials a proposed 
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modification which will accomplish our objectives and at the same time prevent 
denazification from taking years.” He predicted that the change would bring an end to the 
programme “sometime around 1 April 1948” and that in the meantime, “large numbers 
would be able to resume normal occupations.”106 The authorities of the Soviet Zone had, 
by this time, granted an amnesty to all nominal Nazis, and were five months away from 
ending their denazification process. The Soviets then began to echo the complaints of 
EKD leaders against the denazification process; as Walter Dorn was forced to admit, it 
was now “extremely difficult to continue the denazification process in any zone.”107   
   The United States Ends its Involvement 
Following the passage of JCS 1779, the Darmstadt Declaration and the 
Amendment of October 1947, the leadership of the EKD decided it was time to write up 
another “decisive repudiation” of denazification.108 Martin Niemöller, in his capacity as 
the first president of the synod of the Protestant Church of Hessen, Nassau, and 
Frankfurt-am-Main, is credited by some as having dealt the coup de grace to the 
denazification process.109 In a sermon authored by Niemöller titled “Wort an die 
Gemeinde” and read in over one thousand churches in his synod on 1 February 1948, he 	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argued that the EKD had always stood for a true liberation of the Germans from the evils 
of National Socialism, but charged that denazification had had disastrous sociological and 
moral effects.110 It had given birth to a spirit of revenge, as now even Germans were 
taking vengeance on their fellow countrymen, and causing immeasurable injustice. 
Characterising denazification tribunals as “arenas for denunciation and battlefields for 
personal enmities,” he called upon Protestants to cease serving as prosecutors, assessors, 
or witnesses for the prosecution.111 The sermon ended by saying 
 
the attempt to eradicate Nazism with the means of denazification has failed in every 
way. This kind of denazification has led us to recall at every step the years of terror 
that are behind us. Hundreds of thousands of people are under constant pressure and 
succumb to the temptation to resort to all kinds of falsehoods and lies and to wash 
away the truth. Tens of thousands have lost jobs and food or are waiting in the 
internment camps on their judgment …Today the total disaster is manifest. Our 
nation has not gone down a path of reconciliation, but one of retaliation, and the seed 
that has sown new hatred has germinated lush.112 
 
 
Niemöller had also declared that members of the clergy were “forbidden for the 
sake of their own position and the welfare of the community to justify this scandal any 	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…denn der Versuch, den Nationalsozialismus mit den Mitteln dieses Gesetzes 
auszurotten, ist auf der ganzen Linie geschietert. Dagegen hat diese Art der 
Denazifizierung zu Zuständen geführt, die auf Schritt und Tritt an die hinter uns 
liegenden Schreckensjahre erinnern. Hundertausende von Menschen stehen unter 
beständigem Druck und erliegen der Vesuchung, zu aller erdenklichen Unwahrhaftigkeit 
und Lüge zu griefen um sich reinzuwashcen. Zehntausende haben Arbeit und Brot 
verloren oder warten in den Internierungslagern auf ihren Spruch…Heute ist die völlige 
Katastrophe offenbar. Unser Volk ist nicht auf den Weg der Versöhnung geführt worden, 
sondern auf den Weg der Vergeltung, und die gesäte Saat neuen Hasses ist üppig 
aufgegeben. 
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longer by doing any work in connection with denazification”.113 Effectively, this 
statement turned the Protestant Church into a political force.  
Neither the congregations nor Military Government had had any forewarning of 
this sermon. This was a particularly vulnerable time for General Clay, as between two to 
three million Germans in Bizonia had gone on hunger strike to protest food shortages. 
Clay, who was privately a friend of Martin Niemöller and had held dinners for him and 
his wife Else, publicly rebuked Niemöller in a statement he made to the AP on 4 
February: “It is painful for me to see a representative of religious faith offering himself as 
a barrister for those who disregard and offend against the law.”114 He went on to say that 
Germans have the right to criticise the policy, and he urged them to express possible 
modifications, but that denazification was law and as such must be obeyed.115 He also 
stated that he wished to speak with Niemöller again, but that he would not take direct 
action against him. The local government of Hesse reported dismay that Niemöller would 
criticise denazification without giving a single mention to the victims of fascism, as if 
Niemöller could have forgotten the eight years he had spent in concentration camp 
cells.116 Niemöller’s criticisms were not only successful in Hesse: forty-five chairmen 
and other leaders resigned in the Wurzburg district; a strike was organised by the 
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denazification court staff in Munich; and others followed their example throughout 
Bizonia.117  
It is questionable how much real impact this sermon had. Certainly, many people 
heard it and knew about it, but Military Government had already been given orders from 
Congress to begin winding down the process, and there is little evidence that this speech 
brought denazification to a swifter end. What it did succeed in doing, however, was 
making sure that denazification would leave a bitter legacy. Those Germans who had 
been involved in administering denazification tribunals had already been treated as social 
pariahs; this, coupled with the fact that only a small percentage of Germans with a legal 
background were not tainted with Nazism, had led to a severe shortage of administrators 
for the process. The effect of Niemöller’s sermon was to equate being an administrator to 
being a bad Christian, and therefore was an attempt to effectively kill the process.118 By 
this time, the Church (Protestant as well as Catholic) had also gained support from the 
German intellectuals and university authorities, all of which helped to further erode 
Military Government’s defence of denazification.119 
On 11 February 1948, soon after Niemöller’s sermon, Bishop Wurm wrote 
General Clay another letter, in which he attached a report written under Hans Asmussen’s 
direction that addressed further problems with denazification, focusing specifically on 
those who were still interned after almost three years. The report reiterated the EKD’s 
denial of the legality of denazification, this time saying the denazification laws were bad 
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because they “a) were adopted after the crimes were committed and b) punish a new form 
of crime.”120 This memorandum made a number of requests to Clay, among them a plea 
for witnesses to be released, for the lower classifications to be pardoned, and for more 
judicial review in regards to detention. The most interesting note came under the heading 
Beanstandung der Spruchkammerentscheide, or the complaint of the Spruchkammern 
decisions, in which the memorandum’s author argued that just because the EKD had 
admitted to guilt did not mean it was willing to endorse the guilty verdicts of the 
Spruchkammern. Following this list of requests and complaints is about one hundred 
pages of information, mostly in German, of evidence showing the poor conditions and 
negative effects of the interned Germans awaiting denazification in camps across 
Germany. There was much damning evidence in the memorandum, about the treatment 
not just of the interned but also of their families, who were  
 
treated as if they were responsible for the charges against their husbands and 
fathers… salaries, pensions, and allowances are suspended at once. The relatives are 
deprived of all income from business, property in houses or real estate at once. The 
result is terrible economic distress for the family.121 
 
 
One particularly questionable way in which churches sought to delegitimize 
denazification was through the distribution of Persilscheine, or denazification 
certificates. Pastors of all denominations did their best to directly sabotage the process by 
distributing testimonials attesting to the Christian character of those undergoing 
denazification. This practice extended beyond the churches, and many other persons of 
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influence wrote testimonials. These Persilscheine were often not personalised, but rather 
copies that simply had a blank where anyone could write their own name.122 They were 
widely circulated towards the end of denazification, and even helped to secure the release 
of some “Major Offenders”. These certificates help to illustrate how ineffective 
denazification had become. According to the German historian Clemens Vollnhals, 
pastors wrote Persilscheine out of a sense of Christian duty, and church leaders believed 
that “denazification had overthrown the German people in a ‘bloodless civil war.’”123 The 
Persilscheine therefore were not written to protect criminals, but were written with the 
hope of ending the struggle against what the Church saw to be an illegitimate process.124 
The Persilscheine were used in some alarming situations – one example involves 
Sister Helene Schürig, a woman who had confessed that she had assisted in the lethal 
injection of between thirty to fifty children. Although Bishop Wurm did not know 
Schürig, he pleaded that she be treated with mercy, writing that he had gained a 
favourable impression of her and that she had actually saved patients in a few cases. 
Another example involves Professor Otmar Frieherr von Verschuer, the scientist who had 
inspired Joseph Mengele at Auschwitz. During the war, Mengele regularly sent von 
Verschuer shipments of his victim’s body parts. When faced with denazification, his 
pastor, Otto Fricke, who had once been a leader in the Confessing Church, wrote in Von 
Verschuer’s Persilschein that “[p]eople of his type and his character are suited to guide 	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the redirection of the German academic world onto a Christian foundation and promote 
the rebuilding of German life.” Pastor Fricke then furthered his own reputation by citing 
his associations with Wurm and Niemöller.125  
Along with the Persilschein, Walter Dorn found “an elaborate guide for 
clergymen on how to testify before a tribunal on behalf of their parishioners” circulating 
in northern Bavaria.  He mentions that there was a strike on witnesses for the prosecution, 
whereas it was increasingly commonplace to find a “Nazi activist who can produce 
twenty character witnesses” which included clergymen, both Protestant and Catholic.126 
Perhaps in an attempt to both reach a rapidly approaching deadline and to appease 
some of the criticism that had come out of the Niemöller sermon and the EKD 
memorandum, another amendment to the Law for Liberation came in March of 1948. The 
October Amendment had prevented the reclassifying of Nazis who had belonged to 
organisations that had been deemed criminal. Further evidence of the approaching 
conclusion of denazification was produced when Military Government introduced the 
Amendment of March 1948, which relaxed this single provision by allowing “complete 
discretion to Public Prosecutors in instituting charges in those not yet tried.”127 Now all 
but those classified as “major offenders” could expect either amnesty or a small fine for 
their crimes.  
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On 12 March 1948 Clay called Undersecretary Draper in an effort to explain the 
progress of denazification, saying that 
 
My views are well known. I told the Congress it would be late spring before 
denazification was complete. Here again, I would rather lose the appropriation than 
what we stand for in Germany. However if the Army wants it stopped please issue 
orders. I cannot stop denazification except by ordering Germans to stop. If this is an 
order please say so… I do my best, Bill, at all times. I have no other assurances to 
offer. I think you will remember that we here took the lead against much criticism in 
granting amnesties. There is no real problem in Germany involved in completing our 
program. All but Class I have full working rights and we are moving at a rate of over 
100,000 per month against 400,000 backlog. I think I know German reaction and 
stopping would not be good. It would be bowing to criticism in Germany which 
comes only from the Nazi element.128 
   
 
As Clay recounts in his memoirs, the Case subcommittee of the House Select 
Committee submitted a unanimous report to Congress in early 1948, which recommended 
that denazification be put to an end and those awaiting trial who could be identified as 
lesser offenders or followers receive full amnesty.129 American involvement in 
denazification was supposed to be put to an end on May 8, 1948.130 This date was chosen 
because it marked the third anniversary of the end of the war, but the Americans did not 
actually hand complete authority of the process over to the Germans until the twenty-
eighth of that month.131 Public opinion had changed in the United States – instead of the 
New Deal Coalition and the unity that had existed during the war, different attitudes 
reflected by the very conservative eightieth congress had taken hold. Attention had 	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shifted away from legal prosecution of former Nazis to the beginning of the Cold War: 
civil war had broken out in Greece in 1946, and the United States and the United 
Kingdom were supporting the democratic government against the military wing of the 
Greek Communist Party, which was supported by the Soviet Union; then in 1948, the 
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, with the support of the Soviet Union, assumed 
control of that country through a coup d'état.132 Denazification limped on under German 
administration half-heartedly without any oversight from the United States until April 
1950, with sentences growing ever more lenient and appeals making up most of the work 
of the tribunals.  
When denazification was over 9,073,000 of the 12,753,000, or, roughly seventy 
five per cent of the persons in the whole of Germany who had been registered under the 
provisions of denazification laws, had been found “not chargeable” under the law.133 
Most of those who were still awaiting judgment were freed from further trials. This was 
more beneficial to those classified as “major offenders” – those classified as “followers” 
had pressed for faster clearance with hopes of looking for employment, while the more 
prominent “major offenders” with enough money not to be dependent on employment 
had delayed trial in hopes of gathering more evidence and awaiting further legal 
relaxations regarding denazification.134 With the October 1947 and March 1948 
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amendments, over half of those tried had been labelled “followers.”135 The public was 
aware of this apparent misplaced focus, and a popular joke of the time was: 
 
Question: What is the difference between a Spruchkammer and a fishnet? 
Answer: A fishnet catches the big ones and lets the little ones go!136 
 
 
General Clay argued in vain to keep denazification going, writing on 14 March 
1948 to Draper that the Germans still awaiting trial were “increasingly really bad actors” 
and that freeing them “would really discredit entire program.”137 In his memoir he wrote 
that he would abandon financial support as long as he could continue with his 
objectives.138 Reading his account of it, Clay showed zeal for the programme, and in his 
role as military governor he appears to have believed that he could have brought about a 
better outcome. While most accounts of denazification will point out its failures, Clay 
argued that the programme “did prevent Nazis of any consequence from exerting public 
influence during the early, formative period of state government.”139 In a letter written to 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Economic Cooperation Administrator William C. 
Foster dated 31 December 1950 he wrote  
 
[a]lthough shortcomings on the Allied and German sides could not be denied… 
the policy appears to have achieved its primary purpose. Serious offenders have been 
punished and Nazi activists have been largely excluded from public life…The awareness 	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of the German people to the evils of the Nazi regime has been awakened and there exists 
virtually no inclination in West Germany to-day to re-establish a totalitarian government 
whether Nazi or Communist.140 
 
 
He admitted, however, that “[l]ooking back, it might have been more effective to 
have selected a rather small number of leading Nazis for trial without attempting mass 
trials”, but wrote that he had the support of the German public opinion, although he 
allows that they were critical of the actions of the tribunals.141  
When he returned to the United States, Walter Dorn, Clay’s denazification 
advisor, began writing a manuscript about denazification titled The Unfinished Purge that 
remained incomplete by the time of his death. In his manuscript, Dorn tried to explain 
why denazification had failed. One of his arguments was that the trials had not been 
allowed to go on long enough, as Dorn pointed out that the trials against those who had 
collaborated with the Nazis were still ongoing in France and Belgium when the United 
States ended its involvement in denazification.142 Like denazification, these trials also 
had the difficulty of trying collaborators using ex post facto laws, but nonetheless made a 
sincere and successful effort to make sure that those who had collaborated with the Nazis 
could not wield post-war influence. He also made an argument that could help to explain 
why there were so many differing perspectives on denazification. Dorn believed that 
there was a correlation between one’s perspective on denazification and their political 
ideology.143  
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The German attitude towards denazification had changed over the years. The 
historian Frederick Taylor wrote that, “American polling in their zone saw approval of 
denazification slip from 54 per cent in early 1946 to 32 per cent in 1947. It would reach 
its lowest level in 1949 at 17 per cent.”144 It was especially unpopular in rural 
conservative areas, because there especially all of their community leaders – doctors, 
lawyers, teachers – would be the ones appearing before tribunals.145 However, despite 
EKD complaints, public opinion surveys also show that there was no point during 
denazification that there was sufficient opposition from the masses as to “warrant 
cancelling the program.”146 In their book Public Opinion in Occupied Germany: The 
OMGUS Surveys, 1945-1949, Richard and Anna Merritt paint a more complete picture of 
the overall German attitude towards the policy, stating 
 
Summing up, the views on National Socialism, the Nuremberg trials, and the 
denazification proceedings uncovered by the Military Government surveys point to a 
persistent pattern. On the one hand, there were relatively few wholehearted Nazis in 
the American Zone. Our impressionistic judgment, based on a review of all the 
surveys reported in this volume, is that roughly 15 to 18 per cent of the adult 
population were unreconstructed Nazis in the immediate post war period. The bulk of 
Germans emphatically rejected the specifically Nazi aspects and leaders of their 
recent history. And it seemed unlikely, at least for the near future, that they would 
again follow a pied piper of Hitler’s calibre – especially if he were garbed in Nazi 
robes.  
 
 
They then go on to say that while this may be the case, the Germans in the 
American zone had not completely turned their back on National Socialism. Many of the 	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Germans bought into National Socialism, believing that it was a good idea that had been 
executed poorly, and a large number “continued to subscribe to sentiments closely tied up 
with” Nazi racist and reactionary ideology.147 However, it would be wrong to state that 
denazification principles had become unpopular – even in 1949, although they might 
have disagreed with the overall policy, two thirds of polled Germans agreed that it was “a 
good idea that through the denazification system those who had furthered National 
Socialism in any form were held responsible for their actions”.148  
For all of the trouble that denazification wrought, of those Nazis who had been 
successfully denazified, less then one per cent were labelled “Major Offenders”.149 The 
United States ended its involvement in denazification at this time; for better or worse, 
Military Government no longer could support or influence German denazification policy. 
The EKD could now claim responsibility for the moral rehabilitation of the German 
people. The legacy of the programme could now begin to be judged. 
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Epilogue: War Crimes, the Federal Republic, and the Legacy of the Protestant 
Church and Denazification: 1949-1953. 
 
“Lasting reform in Germany must come from within. It must be spiritual and moral. 
While Military Government has not interfered in the internal affairs of the church in 
keeping with our own national policy, it has recognized that religious institutions are 
major elements in the German social structure which must participate in any 
program directed to the building of a peaceful and democratic Germany if it is to 
have hope of success.”1 
- General Lucius Clay 
 
The above quotation comes from Lucius Clay’s 1950 memoir Decision in 
Germany. While it seems to be advocating the same type of Germany that Karl Barth and 
Martin Niemöller were, he goes on to say that there “is as of yet little tangible evidence 
of a new spiritual growth in Germany.” Clay then goes on to state that  
 
[i]t may be too early to judge the success of the denazification law. Certainly it 
developed from the beginning a controversial public opinion between those who 
believed the German people incapable of the task and those who believed that the 
program was so stringent as to retard German recovery…I believed the program 
essential and I knew that the responsible German officials desired that it be carried to 
conclusion.2  
 
 
These sentiments reveal that Clay was more interested in the Church aligning 
itself with Allied Policy rather than being strengthened through independence.  
Starting in 1948 and going into the next year the EKD, in one of its final acts 
under the leadership of Niemöller and Wurm, began a new protest against the trials of 
Germans by the Allies.  Although Military Government had ended its involvement in 
denazification the EKD wanted all trials of Germans to end, including those of war 
criminals still on trial in Nuremberg. In 1949, they wrote and distributed a lengthy 
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memorandum titled “Memorandum by the Evangelical Church in Germany on the 
Question of War Crimes Trials before American Military Courts” which consisted of 
church statements and affidavits collected by the leadership. In order to prevent a ‘new 
wave of nationalism in the German people,’ the memorandum was only printed in 
English, and less than one thousand copies were made.3  
The first document in the memorandum was a letter from Bishop Wurm to 
General Clay, written on 20 May 1948. 4 Wurm begins the letter by assuring Clay that he 
agrees with the goals that Military Government is working towards, and that he only 
disagrees with the execution of the goals, as he launches into a six-point examination of 
Military Government’s plan. The six pieces of Wurm’s argument are as follows: the 
“Handicap of the Defense against the Prosecution,” “Coercion of Witnesses,” “General 
Obligations of International Law,” “Example for Denazification,” “Discrepancy of Name 
and Character of the Tribunals,” and “Lack of Opportunity to have the Nuremberg 
Judgments reviewed by an independent court.” In his fourth point, writing that these trials 
had been based on the failed policy of denazification, Wurm argued that “[a]t a time 
when the denazification, [sic] the shortcomings of which we have repeatedly pointed out, 
is expeditiously brought to a close these trials are but an anachronism.”5 He then finishes 
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his letter by stating that the denazification trials had “a detrimental influence on the 
recovery of sound public opinion and prevents the return of confidence in law and justice. 
The love of our Lord Jesus Christ urges us to make every effort so that desperate, 
sceptical, and nihilistic humanity regain confidence in public order...”6 Along with 
Wurm, Bishops Meiser, Bender, Wuestemann and Martin Niemöller signed the letter.  
The memorandum also includes General Clay’s response from 19 June 1948. As with 
responses to criticisms of denazification, Clay expresses concern that Wurm’s allegations 
were “based largely on unverified reports rather than information within [his] own 
knowledge or supported by verified evidence.” Clay then invites Wurm to visit 
Nuremberg, where he believes he will be better satisfied by the “true situation”. He then 
gives a defence against each one of the Bishop’s six points. When it comes to Wurm’s 
fourth point, the Military Governor differentiates between these trials and denazification 
by saying that the “prosecution of war criminals has always been limited to those cases 
where it was felt serious criminal responsibility existed which demanded punishment by a 
criminal court.”7 He then ends his letter by writing that  
 
I regret that an effort is now being made to discredit a court which may serve to 
prevent again a world being plunged into chaos. Obviously, we cannot now judge the 
effect of the work of the court. That remains to history not yet recorded. I can assure 
you that it is our hope that the work of this court will prove a deterrent to the rise of 
aggression everywhere and thus a lasting contribution to peace.8 	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These two letters are at the beginning of the memorandum and act as a strong 
introduction to the documents that follow, which all continue the argument against 
continuation of war crime trials. The memorandum includes requests for clemency and 
postponement of executions from Military Government, and subsequent denials. It also 
contains examples of “inhumanities committed by the Allies”, such as the forced 
evacuation of Germans in the East, as well as comparisons with other war crimes trials 
being conducted in France, Poland, Yugoslavia, Norway, Holland, and Britain. Wurm 
made sure that all six of the arguments he presented in his letter to Clay were backed up 
in this memorandum as well. The criticisms of the EKD towards the war crime tribunals 
are often similar to the criticisms they levelled against denazification, but they seem to 
have failed to make any sort of impression on the war crimes process. The Nuremberg 
trials were better organised and had much more international support than denazification, 
and although church leaders did make some salient points they were ignored. 
On 23 May 1949 the Allied Military Governments in Trizonia handed over 
governmental authority to the newly established German Federal Republic. Bonn was 
selected as the capital city, and Konrad “der Alte” Adenauer led what quickly became 
known as West Germany as the first Chancellor throughout the following decade and into 
the 1960s. Adenauer had been the mayor of Cologne until the Nazis dismissed him in 
1933. He had chosen to lie low and retired from public life (an “inner emigrant”) during 
the war, and became the mayor again after the war ended.9 He led the Christian 
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Democratic Party, a centre-right party that continues to be Germany’s largest party. The 
party quickly formed an alliance with the Bavarian Christian Social Union, but although 
these parties emphasise their Christianity, they were not born out of the Confessing 
Church or the EKD. Barth had told the Catholic Adenauer in 1946 not to form a Christian 
Democratic Party, and argued that before the ascent of Hitler, the Catholics had had their 
own political party, the Zentrum, or Centre party, and although this was not the 
counterpart of the forthcoming Christian Democratic Party, it was what the Protestants 
feared. 10 Niemöller was also against the creation of the CDU, later adding that “the 
Catholic Church prevented its members from any possible discussion with those left or 
right from the Centre. That is why I regret our getting entangled with a party system 
again.” Following the establishment of the Federal Republic the leaders of the EKD and 
the Confessing Church saw its political and popular influence wane. However, Adenauer 
did take up its crusade against denazification, by arguing that democracy in Germany 
required “reconciliation, not divisive legal procedures.”11 
Adenauer was not a believer in the collective guilt thesis.12 However, despite this 
disbelief that he shared with most Germans, the leader of the Social Democratic Party, 
Kurt Schumacher, was able to convince Adenauer to “politically commit himself to 
reconciliation with” the new state of Israel before Schumacher’s death in August 1952.  
The German Parliament ultimately passed a measure to send “twelve instalments of 3.45 
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billion West German Marks to Israel,” with the full support of the SDP. The CDU, 
however, continued to hold divided opinions about whether or not this was necessary.13 
One of the moves against denazification brought on by Adenauer was an amnesty 
act passed by the Western German Parliament that had the support of the United States 
Government, which went into effect on 31 December 1949. This amnesty pardoned as 
many as 792,000 Germans by 1951, including many who had been “affected by the 
consequences of previous denazification”.14 Those granted amnesty included “black 
market delinquents and petty criminals” as well as “a diverse group of Nazi offenders.” 
This was one of the first laws that the new Republic of Germany had crafted. The wide 
implementation of this amnesty was not well received by the citizens of the former 
enemies of the Reich.15 Although it was not the first amnesty (the “Youth Amnesty” of 
1946 had already pardoned those born after 1919, and the “Christmas Amnesty” the same 
year had pardoned the poorest and the disabled), it was the most controversial yet, as 
people later found to have been “active Nazis or even war criminals” escaped 
denazification through it.16 The West German Parliament, according to the historian 
Norbert Frei, “entertained the notion that discarding all remnants of denazification 
constituted an urgent political task” …“[f]rom its very inception”.17 This amnesty was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13  Moeller, War Stories, 27. 
 
14  Frei, Adenauer’s Germany and the Nazi Past, 15; Richard Overy, The Third Reich: A 
Chronicle (Quercus: London, 2010).  
 
15  Frei, Adenauer’s Germany and the Nazi Past, 19. 
 
16  Herz, “The Fiasco of Denazification in Germany”, 573; Griffith, “Denazification in 
the United States Zone of Germany”, 72; Herz, “The Fiasco of Denazification in 
Germany”, 574. 
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seen as a “symbolic verdict against a denazification process that was in any case 
dying…”18  
Denazification came to an end under German administration in 1950. In 
December of the previous year, the local authorities in Wuertemberg Baden discovered 
evidence that tribunal officials had accepted bribes to tamper with denazification 
documents. It was soon discovered that this corruption reached to the highest levels of the 
administration. It was so out of hand that Hjalmar Schacht, Hitler’s Minister of 
Economics during the first years of the Third Reich who had previously been acquitted at 
Nuremburg, had secured exoneration through a deal with the State Minister for 
Denazification, the former Reichsbank President Karl Stroele.19 The Württemberg Baden 
government had initially tried to suppress this scandal, but word got out to the United 
States High Commissioner, who “threatened to invoke occupational statute if proper 
action was not taken.”20 After much difficulty, the leading tribunal officials were given 
short prison sentences. The Germans were now in a position where they either had to go 
back and retry the last few thousand cases, or give up on denazification all together; 
unsurprisingly, they chose the latter. The following May, Adenauer’s government passed 
a law that restored the pensions of all military officers and every level of civil servant, 
with very few exceptions.21  
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All of this led to a resurgence of a word that had been used in the late forties, the 
fear of “renazification”, because “hardly ten years after it was all over, the same people 
who made Hitler’s state were back to work, if not tidily pensioned.”22 Indeed, by 1958 
almost every German who had been interned was freed, including the war criminals.23 
The Political Scientist John Herz stated that sixty per cent of the Bavarian judges after 
denazification had ended were the judges from during the war, which would explain why 
there became a marked lack of interest in prosecuting former Nazis at this time.24   
Heinz Renner, the Communist party spokesman, said that eighty per cent of all judges 
and prosecutors serving in what was once the British zone were former Nazis or 
Fascists.25 However, there was no true “renazification”. Although former Nazis had been 
free and often given pensions, there was some truth to the idea of the Stunde Null as 
Nazism as a movement in Germany has remained dead since 1945. What this reversal of 
denazification meant was that those who had profited from National Socialism “suffered 
only a temporary setback”, but the worst Nazi culprits remained discredited.26 
I want to end the history of this era with one final episode. The political influence 
gained by the EKD was unofficially put to rest five years after the end of American 	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Collection, 1894-2008, AIS.2007.11, Archives Service Center, University of Pittsburgh – 
Digital Library; Ferdinand A. Hermens, “Denazification or Renazification?”, The Forum, 
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involvement in denazification, in Konrad Adenauer’s first re-election campaign in 1953. 
That year, Gustav Heinemann, a man who had been a member of the original EKD 
council and a signatory of the Stuttgart Declaration, and the first Minister of the Interior 
for West Germany, ran a third party called the Gesamtdeutsche Volkspartei (All German 
People’s Party). He enjoyed the support of the remaining Confessing Church leadership, 
in particular Martin Niemöller. The party advocated for the Barth and Bonhoeffer vision 
of Protestant politics, in particular favouring neutral relations with the USSR, German 
Political Maturity (as opposed to following the West) and continued military 
disarmament. Adenauer rejected the party as too radical, and with its defeat, the ideas of 
its leaders had been defeated as well. By this time Wurm had died, and the EKD no 
longer had its early post-war clout, as it was no longer the institution that could best 
represent the German people. This political party officially dissolved in 1957, and many 
of its leaders joined the SPD. Heinemann would later serve as President of the Federal 
Republic from 1969 to 1974. 
Despite its lack of political influence in Germany, several members of the EKD 
continued to be important international church leaders. Martin Niemöller continued his 
career as an international church celebrity, and toured the world preaching for 
disarmament, and had a high profile meeting with Ho Chi Minh in the late sixties. 
Wurm’s last moment in the public eye was his leadership in the EKD, which he began at 
the age of 77 and ended three years later in 1949. He died in early 1953. Bishop Dibelius 
then led the institution until 1961.  
Almost seventy years on, the legacy of the EKD’s crusade against denazification is 
not as inspiring as its leaders probably hoped it would be. The historian Robert P. 
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Ericksen is particularly critical, writing that “church fears about a harsh and harmful 
denazification proved largely unfounded.”27  Many of the church leaders had rejected the 
Weimar Republic and initially given their support to Hitler, and only distanced 
themselves when they feared losing independence for their churches. Even though they 
expressed guilt at Stuttgart, they then began to avoid the issue of guilt and focus more on 
forgiveness. The use of the Persilscheine proves that churches would support any Nazi 
criminal, no matter how detestable their crime or undeniable their guilt. Of the EKD 
leadership, Niemöller had argued that democracy was not a form of government suitable 
for Germany, and Wurm took every available opportunity to undermine Clay’s work 
instead of working with Military Government to create a better policy. As previously 
quoted in the Introduction, Stuart Hermann had pondered in 1946 about how the Church 
might work with denazification: 
 
Can the Church and Military Government combine forces for the strenuous work of 
German rehabilitation in the society of nations, or will the Church eventually feel 
obliged to adopt Nehemiah’s plan for the reconstruction of Jerusalem’s devastated 
walls to its own circumstances: work swiftly with the tools of spiritual revival, but 
stand ready to repel every new enemy with the weapons of religious resistance?28  
 
The Church, the EKD in particular, chose the latter option. The evidence that this 
dissertation provides helps to answer whether or not this was the right thing to do.  
Denazification is now widely accepted to have been a bad policy.29 Historians and 
Political Scientists such as John Herz and John Kormann were ready to agree on this 
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29  See Introduction, footnote 22. 
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point by 1948. Although Lutz Niethammer had argued in his 1982 work Der 
Mitlauferfabrik that the post Law for Liberation legislation and amnesties aimed at 
rehabilitating the ‘Mitlaufer’ eventually secured denazification objectives, the historian 
Perry Biddiscombe countered that it can only be seen as successful “because it eventually 
addressed the problems caused by its over extension.”30 The historian Frederic Spotts 
argued that Military Government “failed to work cooperatively with the churches, and the 
churches, for their part, ‘failed to make it clear that they honestly wanted genuine Nazis 
out of public life.’”31 Lucius Clay was forced to admit that his hopes for denazification 
were failing in the American zone towards the end.32 
The historian Giles MacDonogh summarised the majority of historians’ attitudes 
when he concluded that  
 
seen as an exercise in punishing criminals, denazification was a farce. A number of 
insignificant PGs were treated with the utmost cruelty while the big fish went free. 
Most of the minor cases were not ideologically committed anyway. Some of the worst 
killers, those who sent thousands to their deaths, who carried out the executions in the 
east as members of police units, or who operated the trains which took Jews to the 
death camps in the General Government, were not punished at all; they retired from 
the police or the railways without anyone having called them to account, and died in 
their beds.33 
 
 
It is worth considering MacDonogh’s thoughts on denazification in conjunction with  
 
Kormann’s: 
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What is truly lamentable, however, is that denazification is now assayed by 
standards that could only have been achieved if large-scale social changes had been 
undertaken, changes which both sides, the Western Allies and the Germans were 
unwilling to see brought about.34 
 
 
Despite its failures, in later decades denazification has appeared to be a successful 
operation to most of the passing public. That is because in the long run West Germany 
did successfully democratise without strong Nazi influence. Denazification’s influence 
has been widespread, as subsequent tribunals after the fall of East Germany and Iraq have 
referred to their housecleaning policies as “destasification” and “de-Baathification.”35 In 
the latter’s case, the result was violent counterrevolution, something that had only been 
feared beneath the surface in Germany. 
Eventually rejected by the German masses, fought at all times by the EKD, and 
abandoned by the United States, denazification in the American Zone failed in almost all 
of its objectives. The blame is often placed on the Military Government and Lucius Clay 
for failing to set and stick to clear objectives and then for extending the programme with 
Law No. 8. Church leaders had fought long and hard against it, and in the end their work 
was vindicated – denazification aims had been “ambiguous and its procedures 
unworkable.”36 It was a poorly executed policy – if the United States had focused on 
removing leading Nazi officials, perhaps things would have been different. If the 
occupiers had done more to work with the EKD in 1945 to remove traces of Nazism, 
perhaps things would have been different. If the EKD, for its part, had not just given 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34  Kormann, US Denazification Policy in Germany 1944-50, 2. 
 
35  Biddiscombe, The Denazification of Germany, 218. 
 
36  Spotts, The Churches and Politics in Germany, 106. 
	   155	  
wholesale condemnations of the policy but had instead worked with the Military 
Government, perhaps things would have been different. These “if”s and “perhaps”s are 
intellectual dead ends. Instead, the United States went after every Nazi party member, 
and with Law No. 8 had made it illegal for anyone who was once a Nazi to hold any form 
of power. The EKD had not been the only group to recognise the impracticality of this 
objective, but it was the only German institution, which had admitted its guilt and had 
legitimacy in a nation that had been almost completely destroyed, which put it in a unique 
position to combat the policy. 
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Appendix 1. Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt 
(Evangelical Church of Germany council, October 1945) 
 
The Council of the Protestant Church in Germany welcomes representatives of 
the Ecumenical Council of Churches at its meeting in Stuttgart on 18.-19. October 1945.  
We are all the more grateful for this visit, as we not only know that we are with 
our people in a large community of suffering, but also in a solidarity of guilt.  
With great pain we say: By us infinite wrong was brought over many peoples and 
countries. That which we often testified to in our communities, we express now in the 
name of the whole church: We did fight for long years in the name of Jesus Christ against 
the mentality that found its awful expression in the National Socialist regime of violence; 
but we accuse ourselves for not standing to our beliefs more courageously, for not 
praying more faithfully, for not believing more joyously, and for not loving more 
ardently.  
Now a new beginning is to be made in our churches. Based on the Holy Scripture, 
with complete seriousness directed to the lord of the church, they start to cleanse 
themselves of the influences of beliefs foreign to the faith and to reorganize themselves. 
We hope to the God of grace and mercy that He will use our churches as His tools and 
give them licence to proclaim His word and to obtain obedience for His will, amongst 
ourselves and among our whole people.  
The fact that we, in this new beginning, find ourselves sincerely connected with 
the other churches of the ecumenical community fills us with great joy.  
We hope to God that by the common service of the churches the spirit of violence 
and revenge, which today again wants to become powerful, will be directed to the whole 
world, and that the spirit of peace and love comes to predominate, in which alone tortured 
humanity can find healing.  
Thus we ask at a time, in which the whole world needs a new beginning: Veni 
creator Spiritus! 
 
Bishop Wurm 
Bishop Meiser 
Superintendent Hahn 
Bishop Dibelius 
Professor Smend 
Pastor Asmussen 
Pastor Niemöller 
Landesoberkirchenrat Lilje 
Superintendent Held 
Pastor Niesel 
Dr. Heinemann
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Appendix 2. Agreement by the churches and Military 
Government on how to denazify 
May, 1946 
 
1)  “Whenever a Public Prosecutor finds that a clergy-man is suspected of being 
an offender under the Law for Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism, his 
name, with the supporting evidence, will be reported to the Minister President, who will 
notify the appropriate Land bishop.  
 
2) “The trial will not be held until at least four weeks after the notification of the 
Land bishop in order to allow the Church time to investigate the charge and to suspend or 
remove the incriminated clergyman prior to trial. 
 
3) “Whenever a clergyman comes up for trial, a proved anti-clergyman nominated 
by the political parties will be one of the assessors. 
 
4) “Press publicity of such trials will be avoided in order to protect the church as 
much as possible.”1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  Oppenheimer, typewritten memorandum to the Deputy Military Governor, subject: 
Denazification Progress Report No. 3, dated May 8, 1946. 
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